

Index

- Abduction of a foreigner, 63–64
- Absolute immunity, 288, 290–292
- Actual seizure, 48
- Adams v. Williams* (stop and frisk), –33
- Admissions. *See* *Miranda* rule
- Affidavits, probable cause and, 4–5
- Aguilar v. Texas* (probable cause), 4, 5, 6
- Alabama v. White* (stop and frisk), 35–37
- Anonymous tips
 - reasonable suspicion from, 30, 35–37
 - stop and frisk from, 30, 35–37
 - that person is carrying a gun, 39–41
 - totality of circumstances test and, 36–37
- Anticipatory warrants, 100–102
- “Apparent authority” to give consent, 121–122
- Argersinger v. Hamlin* (right to counsel), 272
- Arizona v. Evans* (exclusionary rule), 24–25
- Arizona v. Fulminante* (*Miranda* rule), 216, 217, 228–230
- Arizona v. Hicks* (plain view searches), 192–193
- Arizona v. Mauro* (*Miranda* rule), 264–265
- Arizona v. Roberson* (*Miranda* rule), 225–226
- Arkansas v. Sanders* (warrantless search of closed container in vehicle), 143
- Arraignment, *Miranda* rule and, 224–225
- Arrest. *See also* Detention; Searches after arrest; Seizure (arrest); Warrantless arrests
 - abduction of a foreigner, 63–64
 - arising from frisks, 30
 - arrest authority element, 48, 49, 60
 - Atwater v. City of Lago Vista*, 49, 65–67
 - Brower v. County of Inyo*, 48, 58, 301
 - California v. Hodari D.*, 48, 59–60, 301
 - County of Riverside v. McLaughlin*, 61–62
 - defined, 48, 57, 60
 - Dunaway v. New York*, 48, 53–54
 - elements, 48, 60
 - under emergency circumstances, 49
 - Florida v. Bostick*, 48–49
 - forcible abduction and subsequent criminal prosecution, 50, 63
 - Frisbie v. Collins*, 49–50, 63, 64
 - functional equivalent of, 232–234
 - general test, 49
 - in hotel rooms, 117
 - Illinois v. McArthur*, 49, 64–65
 - intention to arrest element, 48, 60
 - Ker v. Illinois*, 50, 63
 - Michigan v. Chesternut*, 48, 56–57
 - for non-jailable offenses, 49
 - Payton v. New York*, 49, 54–55
 - probable cause for, 2
 - for refusing to stop and identify, 31, 43–45
 - seizure and detention element, 48, 60
 - temporary restraint under exigent circumstances, 64–65
 - understanding by the person arrested element, 48, 56–57, 60
 - United States v. Alvarez-Machain*, 63–64
 - United States v. Santana*, 50–51
 - United States v. Watson*, 49, 51–53
 - unlawful, 49–50
 - upon informant information, 3–4
- Arrest authority, 48, 49, 60
- Arrests with a warrant
 - for entry into third party’s home, 87–88
 - probable cause determination, 2
- Arrests without a warrant. *See* Warrantless arrests
- Attorneys. *See* Right to counsel
- Atwater v. City of Lago Vista* (seizure/arrest), 49, 65–67
- “Automobile exception” to warrant requirement, 129, 156
- Automobiles. *See* Motor vehicles; Vehicle stops and searches

- Bail hearings, request for counsel at, 253–255
- Beeper (homing devices), searches and, 182–183
- Berger v. New York* (electronic surveillance), 176, 179–180
- Berkemer v. McCarty* (*Miranda* rule; vehicle stops and searches), 145, 216, 217, 222–223
- Betts v. Brady* (right to counsel), 272
- Bill of Rights, 12
- Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown* (liability), 289, 298–299
- Body searches, 106, 110–111
- Bond v. United States* (vehicle stops and searches), 128, 147–148
- Border searches, for drugs (vehicle stops and searches), 150–151
- Boyd v. United States* (exclusionary rule), 12
- Breithaupt v. Abram* (seizure/things or items), 71
- Brendlin v. California* (vehicle stops and searches), 156, 165–166
- Brewer v. Williams* (*Miranda* rule), 260, 261–262, 263
- Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart et al.* (exclusionary rule), 25–26
- Bright-line rule, 57
- Brinegar v. United States* (probable cause), 2
- Briscoe v. LaHue* (liability), 290–291
- Brower v. County of Inyo* (seizure/arrest), 48, 58, 301
- Brown v. Mississippi* (*Miranda* rule), 217–218
- Brutality, confessions due to, inadmissible in court, 217–218
- Bumper v. North Carolina* (searches with consent), 116, 117–118
- California v. Acevedo* (vehicle stops and searches), 142–143
- California v. Carney* (vehicle stops and searches), 138–139
- California v. Ciraolo* (open fields searches), 190–191
- California v. Greenwood* (searches), 90–91
- California v. Hodari D.* (seizure/arrest), 48, 59–60, 301
- Canton v. Harris* (liability), 299
- Carroll v. United States* (vehicle stops and searches), 128, 129, 130, 143, 144
- “Certain knowledge,” plain view searches and, 187–189
- Chambers v. Maroney* (vehicle stops and searches), 130–131
- Chapman v. California* (*Miranda* rule), 229
- Chavez v. Martinez* (*Miranda* rule; liability), 265–267
- Checkpoints. *See* Vehicle stops and searches
- Chimel v. California* (search after arrest), 72, 106, 108–111, 114, 152
- “Christian burial” case (*Miranda* rule), 260, 261–262
- City of Canton v. Harris* (liability), 289, 292–293
- City of West Covina v. Perkins* (seizure/things or items), 74–75
- Civil liability, 287. *See also* Liability of police officers; Section 1983 lawsuits (Title 42, U.S. Code)
- absolute immunity, 288, 290–291
- Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown*, 289, 298–299
- Briscoe v. LaHue*, 290–291
- Canton v. Harris*, 299
- Chavez v. Martinez*, 265–267
- City of Canton v. Harris*, 289, 292–293
- city’s failure to warn employees about workplace hazards, 296–297
- Collins v. City of Harker Heights*, 296–297
- conscience-shocking conduct of police officer, 300–302
- county hiring decisions, 288, 298–299
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis*, 289, 300–302
- deliberate indifference, 288, 292–293, 300–302
- detaining occupants of premises during search, 78–79
- due process protections, 296–297, 303–305
- failure to read *Miranda* warnings, 265–267
- failure to train, 288, 292–293
- federal law, 288
- good faith defense, 289–290
- Hafer v. Melo*, 295–296
- high-speed vehicle pursuits, 300–302
- Hunter v. Bryant*, 303
- inadequate police training, 288, 292–293
- Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist.*, 300

- Malley v. Briggs*, 291–292
- McMillian v. Monroe County, Alabama*, 299–300
- Mitchell v. Forsyth*, 302
- Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services*, 293
- Muehler v. Mena*, 78–79
- municipalities cannot claim good faith defense, 289–290
- Owen v. City of Independence*, 289–290
- perjured testimony of police officers, 290–291
- plaintiffs’ preference for, 288
- qualified immunity of police officers, 291–292, 302–303
- Saucier v. Katz*, 302–303
- sheriff as agent of county or state, 299–300
- state and state officials protected from Section 1983 suit, 294–295
- state law, 288
- state officials liable in individual capacity, 288, 295–296
- Supreme Court decisions, 288
- Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales*, 303–305
- of towns, 303–305
- vehicle pursuit cases, 300–302
- Will v. Michigan Department of State Police*, 294–295
- wrongful failure to arrest does not violate due process, 303–305
- “Closely related” rule (probable cause), 2, 7–9
- Coercion, confessions due to, inadmissible in court, 217–218
- Collins v. City of Harker Heights* (liability), 296–297
- Colorado v. Bertine* (vehicle stops and searches), 139–140, 141
- Colorado v. Connelly* (*Miranda* rule), 245–246
- Colorado v. Spring* (*Miranda* rule), 246–247
- Confessions. *See also Miranda* rule
- from coercion and brutality are inadmissible, 217–218
- fruit of the poisonous tree and, 16–18
- involuntary, 228–230
- oral and written (*Miranda*), 247–248
- suppressed, when obtained during detention without probable cause for arrest where detention was functional equivalent of arrest, 232–234
- unsigned, 16–18
- Confrontation Clause, 27–28
- Connecticut v. Barrett* (*Miranda* rule), 247–248
- Consent. *See also* Searches with consent
- “apparent authority” to give consent, 121–122
- consent given after an illegal act by police is not valid, 120–121
- drawing suspect’s blood without, 70, 71–72
- lack of, invalidates later search warrant, 117–118
- obtained by deception, 117–118
- silence or failure to object, 126
- tainted, 121
- for vehicle stop or search, 144–145
- warning of right to refuse is not required, 118–119
- for warrantless arrest in private home, 54–55
- who may and may not give, 116
- Constructive seizure, 48
- Containers
- closed, evidence obtained from during inventory search, 140–142
- large, searches prohibited, 137
- in motor vehicles, warrantless search of, 122–124, 131–132, 142–143
- search of, 116
- Contraband, 70, 100–102, 123
- Coolidge v. New Hampshire* (plain view searches; vehicle stops and searches), 83–84, 144, 188, 194
- Counsel. *See* Right to counsel
- County of Riverside v. McLaughlin* (seizure/arrest), 61–62
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis* (liability), 289, 300–302
- Courtroom identification, 205–206
- Crawford v. Washington* (exclusionary rule), 27–28
- Criminal profile, 30
- Cupp v. Murphy* (seizure/things or items), 72–73
- Curtilage. *See also* Open fields searches
- defined, 191
- factors determining, 192
- searches outside do not need warrant or probable cause, 189–190
- warrantless searches permitted, 191–192

- Custodial arrests, 110–111
- Custodial interrogation, 270. *See also* Right to counsel
- custodial, defined, 260
 - defined, 260
 - inadmissible evidence from, 218–221
 - interrogation, defined, 260, 263
 - traffic stops are not, 222–223
- Davis v. United States* (Miranda rule), 255–256
- Davis v. Washington* (exclusionary rule), 27–28
- Deadly force
- defined, 208
 - Graham v. Connor*, 208, 210–211
 - high-speed pursuits, 208–209, 211–213
 - liability under Section 1983, 208, 210–211
 - objective reasonableness test, 208, 210–211
 - probable cause to believe suspect poses threat of death or injury, 208, 209–210
 - rule for: follow department policy strictly, 208
 - Scott v. Harris*, 211–213
 - Tennessee v. Garner*, 208, 209–210, 301
 - United States v. Place*, 212
- Deception, consent obtained by, 117–118
- Delaware v. Prouse* (vehicle stops and searches), 132–133, 165, 171
- Deliberate elicitation standard, 234–235
- Deliberate indifference, 288, 292–293, 299, 300–302
- Detainment. *See* Stop and frisk
- Detention
- with interrogation, probable cause required for, 53–54
 - limited authority to detain occupants of premises while search is conducted, 88–89
 - of motorists to check license and registration, 132–133
 - of motorist upon probable cause of traffic law violation with drug search resulting, 158–159
 - of occupants of premises during search, 78–79
 - search conducted at place of, 111
 - time limits on, 61–62
 - warrantless search at place of, 106
- Devenpeck v. Alford* (probable cause), 2, 7–9
- Dickerson v. United States* (Miranda rule), 217, 230–232
- Doctrine of independent untainted source, 206
- Dogs, for drug detection in vehicle searches, 153–154
- Draper v. United States* (probable cause), 2, 3–4
- Drug courier profiles, 7
- Drug searches, knock-and-announce entries and, 82–83, 92–94, 98–100, 102–103
- Drunk driving
- Miranda rule and, 251–253
 - sobriety checkpoints, 168–170
- Duckworth v. Eagan* (Miranda rule), 240, 250–251
- Due process
- city's failure to warn employees about workplace hazards, 296–297
 - confessions due to coercion and brutality inadmissible, 217–218
 - exclusionary rule and, 12, 14, 15–16
 - extraction of blood as evidence, 71–72
 - lineups as violation of, 198, 200–201
 - notice of remedies for property seized, 74–75
 - pretrial identification, 203–205
 - trial in state court for capital offense without defense attorney is violation of, 270
 - wrongful failure to arrest does not violate, 303–305
- Dunaway v. New York* (seizure/arrest), 48, 53–54
- Eavesdropping. *See* Electronic surveillance
- Edwards v. Arizona* (Miranda rule), 216, 217, 221–222, 224, 225–226, 227, 254, 256
- Electronic surveillance, 175
- Berger v. New York*, 176, 179–180
 - consent by one of the parties, 176
 - constitutionally protected area, 177
 - court order authorizing wiretap must have state authorization, 176
 - electronic devices to record or listen to a conversation is a search, 176, 179–180
 - expectation of privacy, 176–184
 - federal laws and, 176
 - Katz v. United States*, 176, 177, 180–182
 - Kyllo v. United States*, 183–184
 - On Lee v. United States*, 178

- new rule, 176, 177
- old rule, 176, 177
- Olmstead v. United States*, 176, 177, 180, 181
- Osborn v. United States*, 179
- permission by a “friend” to listen in on conversation, 176, 178
- physical trespass not required, 180–182
- in public place, 176, 177, 180–182
- reasonable expectation of privacy and, 176, 180–182
- state laws and, 176
- technological device to explore home is unreasonable without warrant, 183–184
- thermal-imaging device, 183–184
- Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 176, 180
- United States v. Karo*, 182–183
- United States v. Knotts*, 182–183
- warrantless monitoring of a beeper (homing device) in private residence, 182–183
- warrantless use of a homing device in a public place, 176
- Eleventh Amendment, state exemption from Section 1983 lawsuits, 294–295
- Elkins v. United States* (exclusionary rule), 13
- Emergency circumstances, warrantless arrest permitted, 49. *See also* Exigent circumstances
- Entrapment, 277
 - categories of, 278
 - criminal code as determinant of, 278
 - defendant may deny an element of a crime but still raise entrapment defense, 283
 - defense in criminal case, 278
 - defined, 278
 - government agents prepare and induce commission of crime, 278, 284–285
 - government has burden to prove defendant’s predisposition to commit the offense, 278
 - government inducement of defendant to commit crime not otherwise committed, 278, 279–280, 284–285
 - Hampton v. United States*, 281–282
 - Jacobson v. United States*, 278, 279, 284–285
 - Mathews v. United States*, 283
 - objective test, 278
 - predisposition of defendant to commit crime, 278, 281–282
 - Sherman v. United States*, 279–280
 - Sorrells v. United States*, 285
 - subjective test, 278
 - United States v. Russell*, 279, 280–281, 282
 - “unwary innocent/criminal,” 278, 280–281
- Entry, initially illegal, exclusionary rule and, 22–23
- Escobedo v. Illinois* (*Miranda* rule; right to counsel), 220, 270, 273–274
- Evanescent evidence, 73
- Evidence. *See also* Exclusionary rule
 - admissibility of illegally obtained, 18–19
 - confessions due to coercion and brutality inadmissible, 217–218
 - from custodial interrogation, inadmissible, 218–221
 - evanescent, 73
 - excluded under right to due process, 12, 14
 - extraction of blood as evidence, 70, 71–72
 - extraction of bullet as evidence, 73–74
 - fair probability of finding, 5–6
 - forced disclosure inadmissibility, 12
 - fruit of the poisonous tree and, 16–18
 - illegally seized by federal officers, 12, 13
 - initial illegal entry, 22–23
 - “mere evidence” of a crime, 70, 107
 - mistakes by officials other than police, 19–25
 - obtained by illegal acts, 16–18
 - obtained from closed containers during inventory searches, 140–142
 - obtained with reasonable reliance on search warrant, 19–20
 - physical, obtained without *Miranda* warnings, 240, 256–258
 - real or physical, Fifth Amendment and, 71–72
 - right to counsel exclusions (Sixth Amendment), 12
 - searches after arrest to prevent destruction of, 106
 - self-incrimination exclusions (Fifth Amendment), 12
 - state restrictions on, 15–16
 - temporary restraint under exigent circumstances to preserve, 64–65
 - totality of circumstances test, 5–6
 - verbal, 17

- warrantless seizure of, if likely to disappear, 72–73
- Excessive force, liability for, 208, 210–211
- Exclusionary rule, 11. *See also* Fourth Amendment
 - admissibility of evidence obtained through reasonable reliance on search warrant, 19–23
 - admissibility of tape-recordings of nontestimonial calls to police, 27–28
 - application of, 12
 - Arizona v. Evans*, 24–25
 - Boyd v. United States*, 12
 - Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart et al.*, 25–26
 - Crawford v. Washington*, 27
 - Davis v. Washington*, 27–28
 - due process protections, 14
 - Elkins v. United States*, 13
 - evidence illegally obtained, 12, 13
 - exceptions, 12
 - good faith, 20–22
 - independent source doctrine, 23
 - inevitable discovery, 19
 - purged taint, 17
 - reasonable grounds for officers’ mistaken beliefs, 20
 - extending to federal and state criminal proceedings, 12
 - fruit of the poisonous tree and, 16–18
 - illegally obtained evidence, 18–19 *Illinois v. Krull*, 25
 - initial illegal entry, 22–23
 - justifiable entry without warrant, 25–26
 - Mapp v. Ohio*, 12, 13, 15–16
 - Massachusetts v. Sheppard*, 20–22, 21, 25
 - Minnesota v. Olson*, 23–24
 - mistakes by officials other than police, 19–25
 - Murray v. United States*, 22–23
 - Nix v. Williams*, 18–19
 - provisions of, 12
 - purpose of, 12
 - Rochin v. California*, 14
 - searches “shocking to the conscience,” 14
 - state criminal proceedings subject to, 15–16
 - tainted “fruit of the poisonous tree” aspect, 16–18
 - United States v. Crews*, 205–206
 - United States v. Leon*, 19–20, 21, 25
 - warrantless nonconsensual entry, 23–24
 - Weeks v. United States*, 12, 13
 - Wong Sun v. United States*, 16–18
- Exigent circumstances
 - Knock-and-announce searches, 92–93
 - murder scene searches, 86–87
 - for police entry of private home for warrantless arrest, 54–55
 - search warrant for home of third party, 87–88
 - temporary restraint allowed, 64–65
 - warrantless search or seizure justified by, 107
- Extradition Treaty (United States/Mexico), 63
- Failure to train, 288, 292–293
- Fellers v. United States (Miranda rule)*, 217, 234–235
- Felony offenses
 - Miranda* rule required for, 216
 - right to counsel in, 272
- Fifth Amendment. *See also* Self-incrimination
 - custodial interrogation and, 218–221
 - extraction of blood as evidence, 71–72
 - Miranda* rule and, 218–221
 - privilege against self-incrimination, 12
 - seizure of real or physical evidence and, 71–72
 - statements compelled by interrogation may not be used against defendant in criminal case, but it is not until such use that self-incrimination clause is violated, 265–267
 - voice exemplar not protected, 202–203
 - “Fishing expedition,” 30, 86
 - Flight, stop and frisk and, 30, 38–39
 - “Flight plus” factors, 39
 - Florida v. Bostick* (seizure/arrest; bus encounters as seizure), 48–49, 156–158, 163
 - Florida v. Jimeno* (searches with consent), 122–124
 - Florida v. J.L.* (stop and frisk), 39–41
 - Florida v. Royer* (searches with consent), 120–121, 157
 - Florida v. Wells* (vehicle stops and searches), 140–142
 - “Focus” test, 220
 - Force. *See* Deadly force; Use of force
 - Forced disclosure inadmissibility, 12
 - Forcible abduction (arrest), 50, 63
 - 48 hours, as time limit on detention, 61–62
 - Foster v. California* (lineups), 200–201
 - Fourteenth Amendment
 - city’s failure to warn employees about workplace hazards, 296–297

- right to due process guarantees by, 14
- right to privacy protected by, 15–16
- search of third party's property, 85–86
- sobriety checkpoints, 168–170
- state criminal proceedings and, 15–16
- voluntary consent requirement, 119
- Fourth Amendment. *See also* cases
 - under Electronic surveillance;
 - Exclusionary rule
 - arrest and
 - in emergency circumstances permitted, 49
 - in exigent circumstances permitted, 64–65
 - in private home, exigent circumstances required, 54–55
 - for refusing to stop and identify, 31
 - when seizure occurs, 56–57
 - arrest begins in public place/ends in private place, 51
 - body searches, 110–111
 - “closely related” rule, 2, 7–9
 - commonsense judgments and, for stops, 38–39
 - deadly force, 208–209
 - detaining driver to check license and registration, 132–133
 - detaining occupants of premises during search, 78–79, 88–89
 - drug courier profiles valid under, 7
 - electronic surveillance rulings and expectations of privacy, 176–184
 - evidence admissibility and exclusionary rule, 24–25
 - evidence obtained with reasonable reliance on search warrant, 19–20
 - extraction of blood as evidence, 71–72
 - grand jury appearance not protected, 202–203
 - high-speed pursuits, 208–209, 211–213
 - informer “friends” and electronic surveillance, 178
 - investigatory stops, length of, 34–35
 - knock-and-announce searches, 92–93, 93–94
 - luggage protected against search, 147–148
 - mistakes by officials other than police, 24–25
 - motivation for adoption of, 54
 - motor homes and warrantless searches, 138–139
 - murder scene searches, 86–87
 - no-knock entries, 94–95
 - objective reasonableness test
 - for consent to search, 123–124
 - for excessive force, 211
 - officer not required to inform bus passengers they are free not to cooperate, 162–164
 - officer not required to inform detained motorists they are free to go, 161–162
 - open fields searches, 186–187, 189–191
 - passengers, as well as driver, seized during traffic stop, 165–166
 - plain view searches not protected by, 186
 - police officers approaching bus passengers, 156–158
 - privacy expectation
 - of houseguests, 23–24
 - of person in third party's home, 95–96
 - protected by, 15–16
 - trash searches, 91
 - probable cause for arrest, 2, 7–9
 - protective sweep during arrest in a home, 113–114
 - rights of third person in home of another, 87–88
 - right to privacy protected by, 15–16
 - roadblocks
 - to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, 168, 170–171
 - as form of seizure, 58
 - to seek information about a hit-and-run accident, 168, 172–173
 - sobriety checkpoints, 168–170
 - search and seizure
 - of “mere evidence,” 107
 - requirements, 128
 - unreasonable, freedom from, 12, 13, 17
 - searches
 - with consent, 115–126
 - of personal effects of person under arrest, 112
 - of person in third party's home, 95–96
 - of third party's property, 85–86
 - search warrant for home of third party, 87–88
 - seizure under, 59–60
 - state criminal proceedings and, 15–16
 - stop and frisk justified under, 31–32
 - “stop and identify,” 31, 43–45
 - surgery to remove a bullet as evidence is violation of, 73–74

- suspicionless search of parolee, 82, 103–104
- technological device to explore home is unreasonable without warrant, 183–184
- temporary restraint under exigent circumstances, 64–65
- time between arrest and search, 111
- use of force tests, 211
- vehicle stops and searches
 - drug detection dogs and, 153–154
 - police officers approaching bus passengers, 156–158, 162–164
- voice exemplar not protected, 202–203
- voluntary consent requirement, 119
- warrant for routine felony arrest in private home, 54–55
- warrantless arrest
 - for minor criminal offense, 49, 65–67
 - for misdemeanor or felony, 52
- warrantless inventory searches of person and possessions of arrested individuals, 139–140
- warrantless nighttime entry of suspect's home for arrest for non-jailable offense, 55–56
- warrantless searches
 - of containers in motor vehicles, 122–124
 - of murder scene, 86–87
 - of probationer's residence, 82, 97–98
 - of shared dwelling over refusal of physically present resident, 124–126
- warrantless seizure permitted if evidence is likely to disappear, 72–73
- warrant must particularly describe person or things to be seized, 76–78
- Frisbie v. Collins* (seizure/arrest), 49–50, 63, 64
- Frisks
 - arrest from, if probable cause develops, 30
 - beyond *Terry*, not allowed, 37–38
 - extent of, 30
 - for officer protection, 30, 37–38
 - for pat-down for weapons, 30
 - validity of, 30
- Fruit of the poisonous tree
 - evidence obtained illegally, 16–18
 - exclusionary rule and, 16–18
 - interrogation after indictment, in absence of lawyer, 235
 - Miranda* rule and, 258
 - Fruits of a crime, 70
 - Full-custody arrest, 106, 110–111
 - Functional equivalent of arrest, 232–234
 - Functional equivalent of interrogation (*Miranda* rule)
 - “Christian burial” case, 260, 261–262
 - conversation between suspect and his wife, recorded by police officer, 264–265
 - dialogue between police officers distinguished from, 262–263
 - explained, 260
 - right to counsel violation and, 261–262
 - Garbage searches, 90–91
 - Georgia v. Randolph* (searches with consent), 116, 124–126
 - Gerstein v. Pugh* (seizure/arrest; 48-hour detention), 61, 62
 - Gideon v. Wainwright* (right to counsel), 272
 - Good faith actions of officer, in force cases, 211
 - Good faith defense, in civil liability lawsuits, 289–290
 - Good faith exception, to exclusionary rule, 20–22
 - Graham v. Connor* (liability in excessive force cases), 208, 210–211
 - Grand jury, suspect's voice exemplar required, 202–203
 - Griffin v. Wisconsin* (warrantless search of probationer's residence), 98
 - Groh v. Ramirez* (seizure/things or items), 70, 76–78
 - Hafer v. Melo* (liability), 295–296
 - Hampton v. United States* (entrapment), 281–282
 - “Harmless error” doctrine (admissibility of confessions), 216, 228–230
 - Hearsay, informants' information accepted for probable cause, 3–4
 - Hester v. United States* (open fields searches), 192
 - High-speed pursuits, 208–209, 211–213, 300–302
 - Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada et al.* (stop and identify), 43–45
 - Homing devices (beepers), searches and, 176, 182–183
 - Horton v. California* (plain view searches), 186, 187, 194–195

- Hotel guests, search of, 116–117
- Hot pursuit, 26, 51
- Houseguests, right to expectation of privacy by, 23–24
- Hudson v. Michigan* (searches), 102–103
- Hunter v. Bryant* (liability), 303
- Identification procedures. *See* Lineups; Pretrial identification
- Illegal arrests. *See* Arrests
- Illinois v. Caballes* (vehicle stops and searches), 128, 153–154
- Illinois v. Gates* (probable cause), 2, 5–6
- Illinois v. Krull* (exclusionary rule), 25
- Illinois v. LaFayette* (search after arrest), 106, 112
- Illinois v. Lidster* (vehicle stops and searches), 168, 172–173
- Illinois v. McArthur* (seizure/arrest), 49, 64–65
- Illinois v. Rodriguez* (searches with consent), 121–122
- Illinois v. Wardlow* (stop and frisk), 38–39
- “Immediate control” (area of arrested person’s reach), 106, 108–109, 114, 152
- Immediate recognizability requirement, of plain view searches, 186, 188
- Immunity
- absolute, 288, 290–292
 - qualified, 77–78, 291–292, 302–303
- Inadvertent requirement, of plain view searches, 186, 188, 194–195
- In-court identification, 205–206
- Independent source doctrine, 18–19, 23
- Independent untainted source doctrine, 206
- Indianapolis v. Edmond* (vehicle stops and searches), 168, 170–171, 172, 173
- “Inevitable discovery” exception, to exclusionary rule, 19
- Informants. *See also* Anonymous tips
- information from
 - accepted for probable cause, 3–4
 - accepted for stop and frisk, 32–33, 36
 - questionable, 20
 - reliability of, 3–4, 5
- Instrumentalities of a crime, 70, 84, 85
- Intelligent requirement, in searches with consent, 116
- Intention to arrest, 48
- Interrogation. *See also* Custodial interrogation; Functional equivalent of interrogation; *Miranda* rule
- defined, 260, 263
 - to enable police assistance to meet ongoing emergency, 27–28
 - with stationhouse detention, probable cause required for, 53–54
- Inventory searches, 112, 139–142
- Investigative stops
- length of, 30, 34–35
 - of vehicles, 134–135
 - without a warrant, 6–7
- Jacobson v. United States* (entrapment), 278, 279, 284–285
- James v. Louisiana* (search after arrest), 109
- Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist.* (liability), 300
- Katz v. United States* (electronic surveillance; open fields searches), 176, 177, 180–182, 190
- Kaupp v. Texas* (*Miranda* rule), 217, 232–234
- Ker v. Illinois* (seizure/arrest), 50, 63
- King, Rodney, 288
- Kirby v. Illinois* (no right to counsel during lineups), 198, 199, 201–202
- Knock-and-announce searches, 82, 92–94, 98–100, 102–103
- Knowles v. Iowa* (vehicle stops and searches), 144–145
- Kyllo v. United States* (electronic surveillance), 183–184
- Lawyers. *See* Right to counsel
- Legal liability. *See* Civil liability; Section 1983 lawsuits (Title 42, U.S. Code)
- Liability of police officers. *See also* Civil liability
- for excessive force, 208, 210–211
 - Graham v. Connor*, 208, 210–211
 - high-speed pursuits, 213
 - objective reasonableness test, 208, 210–211
- Lineups, 197
- constitutional rights of suspects, 198
 - defined, 198
 - due process rights violated by, 198, 200–201
 - Foster v. California*, 200–201
 - Kirby v. Illinois*, 198, 199, 201–202
 - no right to counsel during, when suspect has not been charged, 198, 201–202
 - right to counsel during, when suspect has been charged, 198–199

- United States v. Wade*, 198–199, 201–202
- Luggage. *See also* Containers
 consent to search, 123
 as an “effect” and protected against search, 147–148
 in vehicle stops, searches permitted, 136–137
- Malley v. Briggs* (liability), 291–292
- Manson v. Brathwaite* (pretrial identification), 203–205
- Mapp v. Ohio* (exclusionary rule), 12, 13, 15–16, 20, 50
- Maryland v. Buie* (search after arrest), 106, 113–114
- Maryland v. Garrison* (searches), 82, 89–90
- Maryland v. Pringle* (vehicle stops and searches; probable cause), 148–150
- Maryland v. Wilson* (vehicle stops and searches), 145, 160–161
- Massachusetts v. Sheppard* (exclusionary rule), 20–22, 25, 76
- Massiah v. United States* (right to counsel), 270, 274–275, 276
- Mathews v. United States* (entrapment), 283
- McMillian v. Monroe County, Alabama* (liability), 299–300
- McNeil v. Wisconsin* (*Miranda* rule), 253–255, 256
- Mental state of defendant, 245–246
- “Mere evidence” of a crime, 70, 107
- Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz* (vehicle stops and searches), 168–170, 171, 172, 173, 252
- Michigan v. Chesternut* (seizure/arrest), 48, 56–57
- Michigan v. Jackson* (*Miranda* rule), 224–225, 254
- Michigan v. Long* (vehicle stops and searches), 137–138
- Michigan v. Mosely* (*Miranda* rule), 256
- Michigan v. Summers* (searches), 78–79, 88–89
- Mincey v. Arizona* (searches), 86–87
- Minnesota v. Carter* (searches), 95–96
- Minnesota v. Dickerson* (stop and frisk), 37–38
- Minnesota v. Olson* (exclusionary rule; searches), 23–24, 96
- Minnick v. Mississippi* (*Miranda* rule), 226–227, 254
- Miranda* rule
 admissibility in federal and state courts of confessions and admissions given during custodial interrogation, 217, 230–232
 admissibility of defendant’s statements based on Sixth, not Fifth, Amendment, 234–235
 admission into evidence of suspect’s refusal of blood-alcohol test is not violation of privilege of self-incrimination, 241–242
 bail hearing and, 253–255
 cannot be overturned by legislation, 217, 230–232
 cases affirming, 215
 Arizona v. Fulminante, 216, 217, 228–230
 Arizona v. Roberson, 225–226
 Berkemer v. McCarty, 216, 217, 222–223
 Brown v. Mississippi, 217–218
 Chapman v. California, 229
 Dickerson v. United States, 217, 230–232
 Edwards v. Arizona, 216, 217, 221–222, 224, 225–226, 227, 254, 256
 Escobedo v. Illinois, 220
 Fellers v. United States, 217, 234–235
 Kaupp v. Texas, 217, 232–234
 Michigan v. Jackson, 224–225, 254
 Minnick v. Mississippi, 226–227, 254
 Miranda v. Arizona, 218–221
 Missouri v. Seibert, 217, 236–238
 Moran v. Burbine, 237
 cases weakening, 239
 Colorado v. Connelly, 245–246
 Colorado v. Spring, 246–247
 Connecticut v. Barrett, 247–248
 Davis v. United States, 255–256
 Duckworth v. Eagan, 240, 250–251
 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 253–255, 256
 Michigan v. Mosely, 256
 New York v. Quarles, 240, 242–243
 Oregon v. Elstad, 237–238, 243–245
 Patterson v. Illinois, 249–250
 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 251–253
 South Dakota v. Neville, 241–242
 United States v. Patane, 240, 256–258
 civil liability of officers and, 265–267

- concern for public safety is exception to, 242–243
- confession after proper warnings and waiver of rights is admissible even with earlier voluntary but unwarned admission, 243–245
- confessions from coercion and brutality are inadmissible, 217–218
- custodial interrogation and, 260, 270
- evidence from custodial interrogation, 218–221
- exceptions to, 240, 242–243, 253
- failure to warn does not require suppression of physical fruits of unwarned but voluntary statements, 240, 256–258
- felony and misdemeanor offenses require, 216
- “harmless error” doctrine, 216, 228–230
- holding of, 216
- importance of, 216
- incrimination resulting from refusal to take blood-alcohol test is not protected by Fifth Amendment, 241–242
- interrogation aspect, 259
 - Arizona v. Mauro*, 264–265
 - Brewer v. Williams*, 260, 261–262, 263
 - Chavez v. Martinez*, 265–267
 - “Christian burial” case, 260, 261–262
 - conversation between suspect and his wife, recorded by police officer, 264–265
 - custodial, defined, 216, 260
 - dialogue between police officers, 262–263
 - functional equivalent of interrogation, 260–265
 - interrogation, defined, 216, 260, 263
 - “mere compulsive questioning,” 266–267
 - Rhode Island v. Innis*, 260, 262–263
 - Section 1983 lawsuit and, 266–267
 - statements compelled by interrogation may not be used against defendant in criminal case, but it is not until such use that self-incrimination clause is violated, 265–267
- interrogation must cease—
 - after accused invokes right to counsel, even if interrogation concerns different crime, 225–226
 - after defendant asserts right to counsel at arraignment, 224–225
 - at moment of suspect’s invoking right to remain silent and right to counsel, 216, 221–222
 - once a suspect has been indicted and has a lawyer, even after receiving *Miranda* warnings, 234–235
 - once suspect requests lawyer, whether consulted or not, 226–227
- laws passed by Congress seeking to overturn *Miranda* are unconstitutional, 217, 230–232
- mental state of defendant, statements from, 245–246
- Moran v. Burbine*, 237
- oral and written confessions, 247–248
- physical evidence obtained without warning, 240, 256–258
- question-first technique of interrogation, 236–238
- request for counsel
 - at bail hearing, 253–255
 - required by the Constitution, 217
 - Sixth vs. Fifth Amendment, 234–235
- sobriety checkpoints, 251–253
- state rules of evidence and mental state of defendant, 245–246
- suppression of confession obtained during detention without probable cause for arrest; where detention was functional equivalent of arrest, 232–234
- test requirements (three questions), 216, 231
- “two-interrogation” cases, 237–238
- unwarned confession followed by warned confession are both inadmissible, 236–238
- valid waiver
 - allows questions provided no misrepresentation or deception by police, 246–247
 - constitutes waiver of right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination, 249–250
 - even if suspect believes interrogation will focus on minor crimes but focus shifts to different and more serious crime, 246–247
 - questioning may continue until and unless suspect clearly requests an attorney, 255–256

- vehicle stops and searches, 216, 222–223
- videotaping of suspected intoxicated drivers, 251–253
- voluntariness of waiver, 255–256
- warnings after police obtain unwarned confession violate rule, 236–238
- wording of warning required only to “reasonably convey” suspect’s rights, 250–251
- Miranda v. Arizona* (right to counsel; right to remain silent), 119, 218–221, 270, 274, 276
- Miranda* warnings, 19
- Misdemeanor offenses
 - Miranda* rule required for, 216
 - right to counsel in, 272
- Missouri v. Seibert* (*Miranda* rule), 217, 236–238
- Mitchell v. Forsyth* (liability; qualified immunity), 302
- Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services* (liability), 293
- Moran v. Burbine* (*Miranda* rule), 237
- Motor homes, warrantless searches of, 138–139
- Motor vehicles. *See also* Vehicle stops and searches
 - probable cause and arrest for crime committed in, 148–150
 - warrantless searches of containers in, 122–124
- Muehler v. Mena* (seizure/things or items; liability), 78–79
- Municipalities. *See* Section 1983 lawsuits (Title 42, U.S. Code)
- Murray v. United States* (exclusionary rule), 22–23
- Naked-eye aerial observation, in open fields searches, 190–191
- Neil v. Biggers* (pretrial identification; reliability of identification), 204, 205
- New York v. Belton* (vehicle stops and searches), 128, 133–134, 136, 152
- New York v. Quarles* (*Miranda* rule), 240, 242–243
- Nix v. Williams* (exclusionary rule), 18–19
- No-knock entries, 82, 94–95
- Non-deadly force, 208
- Non-jailable offenses, arrests for, 49, 65–67
- “No trespassing” signs, open fields searches and, 189–190
- Objective reasonableness test
 - for consent to search, 123–124
 - in excessive force cases, 208, 210–211
- Objective test, of entrapment, 278
- Ohio v. Robinette* (vehicle stops and searches), 156, 161–162
- Oliver v. United States* (open fields searches), 187, 189–190, 192
- Olmstead v. United States* (electronic surveillance), 176, 177, 180, 181
- Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 176, 180
- On Lee v. United States* (electronic surveillance), 178
- Open fields searches, 185. *See also* Curtilage
 - all sense observations permitted (sight, smell, hearing, touch, taste), 187
 - California v. Ciraolo*, 190–191
 - defined, 186
 - expectation of privacy and, 189–190
 - Fourth Amendment protection (none), 186–187, 189–191
 - Hester v. United States*, 192
 - Katz v. United States*, 190
 - naked-eye aerial observations permitted, 190–191
 - non-enclosed or public areas, 191–192
 - “no trespassing” signs, 189–190
 - Oliver v. United States*, 187, 189–190, 192
 - plain view searches distinguished from, 186–187
 - United States v. Dunn*, 187, 191–192
 - warrantless search of barn not part of curtilage of house, 191–192
- Oregon v. Elstad* (*Miranda* rule), 237–238, 243–245
- Osborn v. United States* (electronic surveillance), 179
- Owen v. City of Independence* (liability), 289–290
- Parolees, suspicionless search of, 82, 103–104
- Particularity requirement, 77
- Passengers in motor vehicle
 - arrest of, for probable commission of crime, 148–150
 - bus, and encounters with police, 49, 147–148, 162–164

- may be ordered to exit car in traffic stop, 160–161
- search of belongings of, 145–146
- seizure of, during traffic stop, under Fourth Amendment, 165–166
- traveling on public transportation, 156–158
- Pat-down for weapons, as extent of frisk, 30
- Patterson v. Illinois* (Miranda rule), 249–250
- Payton v. New York* (seizure/arrest), 49, 54–55
- Pennsylvania v. Labron* (vehicle stops and searches), 143–144
- Pennsylvania v. Mimms* (vehicle stops and searches), 145, 160–161, 162
- Pennsylvania v. Muniz* (Miranda rule), 251–253
- Perjured testimony of police officers, 290–291
- Personal effects, searching of, 106, 112
- Photographic identifications, 198
- Physical torture, confessions due to, inadmissible in court, 217–218
- Plain view searches, 185
 - Arizona v. Hicks*, 192–193
 - “certain knowledge” vs. probable cause, 187–189
 - Coolidge v. New Hampshire*, 188, 194
 - defined, 186, 193
 - Fourth Amendment protection (none), 186
 - Horton v. California*, 186, 187, 194–195
 - immediate recognizability, 186, 188
 - inadvertent requirement abandoned, 186, 194–195
 - limited to officer’s sight area, 186, 188
 - location of seizable property, 186
 - officer must legally be in place to see item, 186, 188
 - open fields searches distinguished from, 186–187
 - probable cause issues, 186, 187–189, 192–193
 - reasonable suspicion, 193
 - requirements for, 186, 188
 - Texas v. Brown*, 187–189
- Police-citizen encounter on a bus, 49
- Police misconduct, minimization of, by exclusionary rule, 12
- Powell v. Alabama* (right to counsel), 270, 271
- Predisposition to commit crime. *See* Entrapment
- Pretrial identification, 197
- illegal, if arrest is illegal, 205–206
- Manson v. Brathwaite*, 203–205
- Neil v. Biggers*, 204, 205
- reliability of, 203–205
- right to counsel, 198
- right to due process, 198
- Stovall v. Denno*, 204
- United States v. Crews*, 205–206
- voice exemplar required, 202–203
- Privacy
 - arrests and, 51
 - beepers (homing devices) in home, 182–183
 - exclusionary rule as protection of, 23–24
 - expectation of
 - bus passengers, 147–148
 - electronic surveillance and, 176–184
 - by hotel guests, 117
 - by house guests, 23–24
 - invalid, for trash left for collection, 90–91
 - luggage, 147–148
 - in open fields searches, 189–190
 - of person in third party’s home, 95–96
 - surgery to remove a bullet as evidence is intrusion into, 73–74
- Private home, warrantless arrest in, 54–55
- Probable cause, 1. *See also Terry v. Ohio*; *United States v. Cortez*
 - affidavits for warrants, 4–5
 - Aguilar v. Texas*, 4, 5, 6
 - arbitrary stopping of vehicles, 132–133, 135
 - arising from frisks, 30
 - arrest for crime committed in a motor vehicle, 148–150
 - for arrest with and without a warrant, 48
 - border searches and, 150–151
 - Brinegar v. United States*, 2
 - “closely related” rule, 7–9
 - day-to-day policing and, 2
 - deadly force and, 208, 209–210
 - defined, 2
 - detaining driver to check license and registration, 132–133
 - determined by police officers, 148–150
 - Devenpeck v. Alford*, 2, 7–9
 - Draper v. United States*, 2, 3–4
 - fair probability of finding, 5–6
 - 48-hour detention and, 61–62
 - Fourth Amendment and, 2, 7–9
 - Illinois v. Gates*, 2, 5–6

- informant information accepted for, 3–4
- inspection of vehicle passengers' belongings, 145–146
- investigative stop without a warrant, 6–7
- luggage search and, 147–148
- Maryland v. Pringle*, 148–150
- more-than-50-percent-certainty rule, 2
- open fields searches and, 186
- plain view searches and,
 - 186, 187–189, 192–193
- reasonable suspicion distinguished from,
 - 30, 35–37, 128
- scope of allowable searches of vehicles,
 - 136–137
- for search of third party's property, 85–86
- search requirement, 82
- for a search warrant, 82
- for seizure of things or items, 70
- situations used in, 2
- Spinelli v. United States*, 4–5
- for stationhouse detention with interrogation, 53–54
- subjectiveness of, 2
- totality of circumstances test, 6–7
 - for investigatory stops of vehicles, 134–135
- for traffic violation, with drug search resulting, 158–159
- United States v. Chadwick*, 131–132
- United States v. Ross*, 136–137
- United States v. Sokolow*, 6–7
- in vehicle searches, 129–131
- vehicle search incident to arrest, 144–145
- warrantless arrest in public place, 51–53
- warrantless searches
 - of automobiles, 129–131
 - of containers in motor vehicles, 142–143
 - of movable container in motor vehicle,
 - in absence of exigent circumstances, 131–132
 - of probationer's residence, 82, 97–98
 - Whren v. United States*, 8
- Probationers
 - conditions levied upon, 98
 - warrantless search of residence of, 82, 97–98
- Profiles
 - drug courier, 7
 - reasonable suspicion and, 30
- Protective search, 37–38, 113–114
- Psychological coercion, confessions due to, inadmissible in court, 218
- Punitive force, 208
- Purged taint exception, to exclusionary rule, 17–18
- Qualified immunity,
 - 77–78, 291–292, 302–303
- Question-first technique (*Miranda*), 236–238
- Reasonable force, 208
- Reasonableness, rule of, in searches, 82
- Reasonable person, probable cause defined for, 2
- Reasonable suspicion. *See also* Stop and frisk
 - anonymous tip accepted for, 30
 - border searches and, 150–151
 - commonsense judgments and, for stops, 38–39
 - how an officer determines, 30
 - no-knock entries, 82, 94–95
 - plain view searches and, 193
 - probable cause distinguished from,
 - 30, 35–37, 128
 - as stop-and-frisk justification, 30
 - totality of circumstances test, 30, 41–42
 - in vehicle stops, 128
 - warrantless search of probationer's residence, 82, 97–98
- Reliability test, for probable cause, 4–6
- Rhode Island v. Innis* (*Miranda* rule), 260, 262–263
- Richards v. Wisconsin* (searches), 93–94, 95
- Right to counsel, 72, 269. *See also* Lineups
 - Argersinger v. Hamlin*, 272
 - at bail hearing, 253–255
 - Betts v. Brady*, 272
 - custodial interrogation and, 270
 - defendant, charged and with attorney,
 - questioned without attorney, 270, 274–275
 - Escobedo v. Illinois*, 270, 273–274
 - in felony cases, 272
 - Gideon v. Wainwright*, 272
 - for indigent who is charged with felony offense in state court, 272
 - interrogation must stop, whether suspect confers with counsel or not, 226–227
 - interrogation outside police station, 270
 - interrogation prohibited after defendant asks for, at arraignment, 224–225
 - invoking of prohibits interrogation for a crime different from present one, 225–226

- Massiah v. United States*,
270, 274–275, 276
- Miranda v. Arizona*, 270, 274, 276
in misdemeanor cases, 272
- Powell v. Alabama*, 270, 271
privilege revoked after valid waiver of
Miranda rights, 249–250
- Sixth Amendment guarantee, 12,
270, 271
- Spano v. New York*, 275
suspect in serious offense is entitled to
lawyer during interrogation at police
station, 270, 273
- trial in state court for capital offense
without defense attorney violates
right to due process, 270, 271
- United States v. Henry*, 270, 275–276
violated if police create situation likely to
elicit incriminating statements,
270, 275–276
- Right to remain silent. *See Miranda* rule
- Roadblocks. *See Vehicle* stops and searches
- Rochin v. California* (exclusionary rule;
seizure/things or items), 14, 71
- Samson v. California* (searches), 82, 103–104
- Saucier v. Katz* (liability), 302–303
- Schmerber v. California* (seizure/things or
items), 70, 71–72, 74
- Schneekloth v. Bustamonte* (searches with
consent), 116, 118–119
- Scott v. Harris* (high-speed pursuits; deadly
force), 211–213
- Searches, 81. *See also* Electronic surveil-
lance; Fourth Amendment; Open fields
searches; Plain view searches; Search
warrants; Vehicle stops and searches;
Warrantless searches
- anticipatory warrants and, 100–102
- area within a person’s immediate control,
106, 108–109, 114, 152
- arrest warrant and entry into third party’s
home, 87–88
- authorization for, 82
- California v. Greenwood*, 90–91
- civil liability of officers and, 78–79
- Coolidge v. New Hampshire*, 83–84
- Griffin v. Wisconsin*, 98
- Hudson v. Michigan*, 102–103
- knock-and-announce, 82, 83, 92–93,
93–94, 102–103
- Maryland v. Garrison*, 82, 89–90
- Michigan v. Summers*, 88–89
- Mincey v. Arizona*, 86–87
- Minnesota v. Carter*, 95–96
- Minnesota v. Olson*, 96
- no-knock entries, 82, 94–95
- no limits to places searched, 82
- of person in third party’s home, 95–96
- probable cause and, 2
- protective, 37–38
- Richards v. Wisconsin*, 93–94, 95
- Samson v. California*, 82, 103–104
- scope of, governed by rule of reason-
ableness, 82
- seizures distinguished from, 82
- Semayne’s Case*, 92
- “shocking to the conscience,” 14
- Steagald v. United States*, 82, 87–88
- suspicionless search of parolee, 103–104
- of third party’s property, 85–86
- time factor in, 82–83, 98–100, 106, 111
- United States v. Banks*, 82, 98–100, 102
- United States v. Grubbs*, 100–102
- United States v. Knights*, 97–98, 104
- United States v. Ramirez*, 82, 94–95
- warrantless murder scene, 86–87
- warrant required for crime scene investi-
gations, 87
- Wilson v. Arkansas*,
82, 92–93, 94, 95, 102
- Zurcher v. Stanford Daily*, 85–86
- Searches after arrest, 105
- area within a person’s immediate control,
106, 108–109, 114, 152
- body searches, 106, 110–111
- Chimel v. California*, 106, 108–111, 114
- extension of police authority to arrest, 106
- Illinois v. LaFayette*, 106, 112
- inventory searches, 112
- James v. Louisiana*, 109
- limited protective sweep during arrest in
home, 106, 113–114
- limits to, 106
- Maryland v. Buie*, 106, 113–114
- “mere evidence” and, 107
- for officer safety, 106
- of personal effects of a person under
lawful arrest, 106
- at place of detention, 111
- to prevent the destruction of evidence, 106
- Shipley v. California*, 109
- United States v. Edwards*, 111
- United States v. Robinson*, 106, 110–111
- Vale v. Louisiana*, 106, 109
- validity of warrantless seizures, 107

- Warden v. Hayden*, 107
warrantless searches
 of a house after arrest elsewhere, 109
 at place of detention, 106
- Searches of people in vehicles. *See* Vehicle stops and searches
- Searches with consent, 115
 “apparent authority” to give, 121–122
 Bumper v. North Carolina, 116, 117–118
 consent given after an illegal act by police is not valid, 120–121
 consent obtained by deception, 117–118
 consent to enter a dwelling, 116
 containers, 116, 122–124
 as exception to Fourth Amendment, 116
 Florida v. Jimeno, 122–124
 Florida v. Royer, 120–121
 Georgia v. Randolph, 116, 124–126
 hotel staff, 116–117
 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 121–122
 intelligent requirement, 116
 lack of consent invalidates later warrant, 117–118
 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 116, 118–119
 silence or failure to object, 116, 126
 Stoner v. California, 116–117
 tainted consent, 121
 Terry v. Ohio, 121
 totality of circumstances requirement, 116
 United States v. Ross, 123
 validity requirement, 116
 voluntary requirement, 116, 118–119
 warning of right to refuse is not required, 116, 118–119
 warrantless search of shared dwelling
 over express refusal of consent, 124–126
 who may and may not give consent, 116
 written consent, 116
- Search incident to arrest, 133–134, 144–145
- Search warrants. *See also* Warrantless searches
 ambiguous in scope, 89–90
 anticipatory, 100–102
 crime scene investigations and, 86–87
 detaining occupants of premises during search, 78–79
 evidence admissibility and exclusionary rule, 19–23
 issued by neutral and detached magistrate requirement, 82, 83–84
 limited authority to detain occupants of premises while search is conducted, 88–89
 officers’ reasonable reliance on, 19–20
 overbroad in description, but based on reason, 89–90
 particular description of place to be searched and things to be seized requirement, 70, 76–78, 82
 probable cause requirement, 82
 supporting oath or affirmation requirement, 82
 validity requirements, 82, 83–84
- Seatbelt violation, arrest for, 49, 65–67
- Section 1983 lawsuits (Title 42, U.S. Code).
 See also Civil liability
 city’s failure to warn employees about workplace hazards, 296–297
 conscience-shocking conduct of police officer, 300–302
 county hiring decisions, 298–299
 due process and, 303–305
 failure to read *Miranda* warnings, 265–267
 municipalities
 deliberate indifference, 292–293, 300–302
 liability for failure to train, 292–293
 liability under; no good faith defense, 289–290
 of officers, in high-speed pursuits, 213
 perjured testimony of police officers, 290–291
 qualified immunity of police officers, 291–292, 302–303
 self-incrimination and, 265–267
 sheriff as agent of county or state, 299–300
 state officials liable in individual capacity, 295–296
 states and state officials protected from, 294–295
 of towns, 303–305
 unreasonable searches and seizures and, 78–79
- Seizure (arrest), 47. *See also* Arrest
 abduction of a foreigner, 63–64
 actual seizure, 48
 arrest authority element, 48
 arrest without warrant in public place, 51–53
 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 49, 65–67
 Brower v. County of Inyo, 48, 58

- California v. Hodari D.*, 48, 59–60, 301
 categories, 48
 civil liability of officers and, 78–79
 constructive seizure, 48
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 61–62
 defined, 48–49
 detention of suspect, time limits on, 61–62
Dunaway v. New York, 48, 53–54
 elements, 48
 entering private home for warrantless
 felony arrest must be justified by
 exigent circumstances, 54–55
 under exigent circumstances, 64–65
Florida v. Bostick, 48–49
 forcible abduction and, 50, 63
 under Fourth Amendment, 49, 59
Frisbie v. Collins, 49–50, 63, 64
Gerstein v. Pugh, 61, 62
 illegal, 48
Illinois v. McArthur, 49, 64–65
 intention to arrest element, 48
Ker v. Illinois, 50, 63
Michigan v. Chesternut, 48, 56–57
Payton v. New York, 49, 54–55
 probable cause
 required, 48
 for stationhouse interrogation, 53–54
 roadblocks as form of, under Fourth
 Amendment, 58
 seizure and detention element, 48
 show of authority and, 59–60
 temporary restraint under exigent
 circumstances, 64–65
 understanding by the person arrested
 element, 48, 49, 56–57
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 63–64
United States v. Santana, 50–51
United States v. Watson, 49, 51–53
 unlawful, 49–50
 use of force and, 48
 warrantless arrest
 beginning in public place/ending in
 private place, 50–51
 for minor criminal offense, 65–67
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 55–56
 when it occurs, 48, 58
 when none occurs, 59–60
 with and without a warrant, 48
- Seizure (of things or items), 69. *See also*
 Warrantless seizure
Breithaupt v. Abram, 71
 categories, 70
City of West Covina v. Perkins, 74–75
 contraband, 70
Cupp v. Murphy, 72–73
 defined, 70
 detaining occupants of premises during
 search, 78–79
 drawing blood from suspect without
 consent, 70, 71–72
 evanescent evidence, 73
 fruits of a crime, 70
Groh v. Ramirez, 70, 76–78
 instrumentalities of a crime, 70
 “mere evidence” of a crime, 70
Muehler v. Mena, 78–79
 notice of remedies for property seized,
 74–75
 probable cause required, 70
Rochin v. California, 71
Schmerber v. California, 70, 71–72
 surgery to remove bullet as evidence,
 70, 73–74
 warrantless nighttime entry of suspect’s
 home for arrest for non-jailable
 offense, 55–56
 warrantless seizure, if evidence is likely
 to disappear, 72–73
 warrant must particularly describe person
 or things to be seized, 70, 76–78
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 55–56
Winston v. Lee, 70, 73–74
 with or without a warrant, 70
- Seizure and detention, 48
- Self-incrimination
 Fifth Amendment protection against, 12
 privilege revoked after valid waiver of
 Miranda rights, 249–250
 protected for testimonial or communica-
 tive evidence only, 251–253
 refusal to take blood-alcohol test not
 protected by Fifth Amendment,
 241–242
 Section 1983 and, 265–267
 seizure of real or physical evidence and,
 71–72
 when violation occurs, 265–267
Semayne’s Case (searches), 92
Sherman v. United States (entrapment),
 279–280
Shipley v. California (search after arrest),
 109
 “Shocking to the conscience” (searches),
 14
 Show of authority is not seizure, 59–60
 Showups, 198

- Silence or failure to object
 - to search, 126
 - to search with consent, 116
- Silver platter doctrine, 13
- Sixth Amendment. *See also* Right to counsel
 - deliberate-elicitation standard, 235
 - to determine admissibility of suspect's statements after indictment, 234–235
 - right to counsel, 12
- Sobriety checkpoints, 168–170
- Sorrells v. United States* (entrapment), 285
- South Dakota v. Neville* (*Miranda* rule), 241–242
- Spano v. New York* (right to counsel), 275
- Spinelli v. United States* (probable cause), 4–5
- Spouses, consent to search by, 116, 117
- States
 - exclusionary rule applicable to, 15–16
 - limits on use of force, 210
 - state and state officials protected from Section 1983 suit, 294–295
 - state officials liable in individual capacity, 295–296
- State v. O'Brenski* (independent source doctrine), 206
- Stationhouse detention, 53–54
- Steagald v. United States* (searches), 82, 87–88
- Stoner v. California* (searches with consent), 116–117
- Stop and frisk, 29. *See also* Frisks; *Terry* stops
 - Adams v. Williams*, 32–33
 - Alabama v. White*, 35–37
 - anonymous tip accepted for, 30, 35–37
 - anonymous tip that person is carrying a gun, 39–41
 - defined, 30
 - Florida v. J.L.*, 39–41
 - frisk after a stop, 30
 - frisk beyond *Terry* is invalid, 37–38
 - Hübel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada et al.*, 43–45
 - Illinois v. Wardlow, 38–39
 - Minnesota v. Dickerson*, 37–38
 - presence in high-crime area and unprovoked flight, 30, 38–39
 - protective search, 37–38
 - reasonable suspicion
 - how an officer determines, 30
 - from observation of unusual conduct, 31–32
 - probable cause vs., 35–37
 - totality of circumstances test, 41–42
 - validity of, 31–32
 - from a wanted poster, 33–34
 - “stop and identify,” 31, 43–45
 - Terry v. Ohio*, 30, 31–32
 - from third-party information, 32–33
 - time limit for length of (none), 30, 34–35
 - totality of circumstances test, 36–37
 - United States v. Arvizu*, 41–42
 - United States v. Hensley*, 33–34
 - United States v. Sharpe*, 34–35
 - “Stop and identify,” 31, 43–45
- Stops, 30. *See also* *Terry* stops; Vehicle stops and searches
- Stovall v. Denno* (pretrial identification; admissibility of identification testimony), 204
- Subjective test, of entrapment, 278
- Suspects
 - lineups as violation of due process rights, 198, 200–201
 - no right to counsel during lineup, when suspect has not been charged, 198, 201–202
 - right to counsel during lineup, when suspect has been formally charged, 198–199
 - voice exemplar required for grand jury, 202–203
- Suspicionless searches
 - at the border, for drugs, in vehicle stops and searches, 150–151
 - of parolee, not Fourth Amendment violation, 82, 103–104
- Tainted “fruit of the poisonous tree.”
 - See* Fruit of the poisonous tree
- Tape-recordings, admissibility of nontestimonial calls to police, 27–28
- Technology. *See* Electronic surveillance
- Tennessee v. Garner* (deadly force), 208, 209–210, 301
- Terry* stops, 33–34, 38–39, 145
- Terry v. Ohio* (stop and frisk), 7, 30, 31–32, 37–38, 40, 42, 86, 113, 121, 137, 233
- Texas v. Brown* (plain view searches), 187–189
- Thermal-imaging devices, 183–184
- Third parties
 - “apparent authority” to give consent, 121–122
 - search and privacy expectation of visitors in home of, 95–96

- searches of property belonging to, 85–86
- search warrant for home, 87–88
- Third-party information, as justification for stop and frisk, 32–33
- Thornton v. United States* (vehicle stops and searches), 128, 151–153
- Time
 - between arrest and search, 106, 111
 - for detention of suspect, 61–62
 - in knock-and-announce searches, 82–83, 98–100
 - for length of investigative stop, 30, 34–35
- Title 42 United States Code Section 1982 lawsuits. *See* Civil liability; Section 1983 lawsuits
- Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 176, 180
- Torture, confessions due to, inadmissible in court, 217–218
- Totality of circumstances test
 - anonymous tips and stop and frisk, 36–37
 - bus passengers not required to cooperate with police, 156–158
 - fair probability of finding evidence, 5–6
 - Illinois v. Gates* (probable cause), 5–6
 - investigative stop without a warrant, 6–7
 - knock-and-announce time factor and, 98–100
 - reasonable suspicion based on, 30, 41–42
 - searches with consent and, 116
 - United States v. Sokolow* (probable cause), 6–7
 - voluntariness of consent determined by, 118–119
- Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales* (liability), 303–305
- Trash searches, 90–91
- Triggering events, for anticipatory warrants, 100–102
- Two-pronged reliability test for probable cause
 - replaced by “totality of circumstances” test, 4–6
 - requirements, 6
- Understanding by the person arrested, 48, 56–57
- United States v. Alvarez-Machain* (seizure/arrest), 63–64
- United States v. Arvizu* (stop and frisk), 41–42
- United States v. Banks* (searches), 82, 98–100, 102
- United States v. Chadwick* (vehicle stops and searches; search and seizure of containers), 131–132, 143
- United States v. Cortez* (vehicle stops and searches), 7, 134–135
- United States v. Crews* (pretrial identification), 205–206
- United States v. Dionisio* (voice exemplar; grand jury appearance), 202–203
- United States v. Drayton* (vehicle stops and searches), 162–164
- United States v. Dunn* (open fields searches), 187, 191–192
- United States v. Edwards* (search after arrest), 106, 111
- United States v. Flores-Montano* (vehicle stops and searches), 128, 150–151
- United States v. Grubbs* (searches), 100–102
- United States v. Henry* (right to counsel), 270, 275–276
- United States v. Hensley* (stop and frisk), 33–34
- United States v. Karo* (electronic surveillance), 182–183
- United States v. Knights*, 104
- United States v. Knights* (searches), 97–98
- United States v. Knotts* (electronic surveillance), 182–183
- United States v. Leon* (exclusionary rule), 19–20, 21, 25
- United States v. Martinez-Fuerte* (vehicle stops and searches), 169, 171, 173
- United States v. Patane* (*Miranda* rule), 240, 256–258
- United States v. Place* (deadly force), 212
- United States v. Ramirez* (searches), 82, 94–95
- United States v. Robinson* (search after arrest), 106, 110–111, 134, 145
- United States v. Ross* (probable cause; searches with consent; vehicle stops and searches), 123, 128, 132, 134, 136–137, 143, 146
- United States v. Russell* (entrapment), 279, 280–281, 282
- United States v. Santana* (seizure/arrest), 50–51
- United States v. Sharpe* (stop and frisk), 34–35
- United States v. Sokolow* (probable cause), 6–7
- United States v. Wade* (lineups), 198–199, 201–202

- United States v. Watson* (seizure/arrest), 49, 51–53
- Unsigned confessions, 16–18
- “Unwary innocent/unwary criminal,” in entrapment, 278, 280–281
- Use of force, 207. *See also* Deadly force
- Graham v. Connor*, 208, 210–211
- high-speed pursuits, 208–209, 211–213
- non-deadly, 208
- Scott v. Harris*, 211–213
- in seizure (arrest), 48
- state limits on, 210
- Tennessee v. Garner*, 208, 209–210, 301
- Vale v. Louisiana* (search after arrest), 106, 109
- Validity requirement, in searches with consent, 116
- Vehicles. *See* High-speed pursuits
- Vehicle stops and searches, 127, 155
- absence of policy for opening closed containers, 140–142
- arbitrary stopping without probable cause, prohibited, 132–133, 135
- Arkansas v. Sanders*, 143
- arrest on probable cause that crime was committed in vehicle, 148–150
- automobile exception, 156
- Berkemer v. McCarty*, 145
- Bond v. United States*, 128, 147–148
- California v. Acevedo*, 142–143
- California v. Carney*, 138–139
- Carroll v. United States*, 128, 129, 130, 143, 144
- Chambers v. Maroney*, 130–131
- Chimel v. California*, 152
- Colorado v. Bertine*, 139–140, 141
- Coolidge v. New Hampshire*, 144
- detaining driver to check license and registration, 132–133
- driver and passenger required to exit vehicle, 160–161
- drug-detection dogs, 153–154
- Florida v. Wells*, 140–142
- Illinois v. Caballes*, 128, 153–154
- investigatory stop, 134–135
- Knowles v. Iowa*, 144–145
- large container searches prohibited, 137
- luggage or package searches permitted, 136–137
- luggage protected against search, 147–148
- Maryland v. Pringle*, 148–150
- Michigan v. Long*, 137–138
- motor homes and warrantless searches, 138–139
- New York v. Belton*, 128, 133–134, 136, 152
- officers’ rights in, 128, 156
- opening of closed containers after vehicle impoundment, 140–142
- passenger compartment, with reasonable belief of danger, 137–138
- of passenger compartment after lawful arrest, 151–153
- Pennsylvania v. Labron*, 143–144
- police may inspect passengers’ belongings with probable cause, 145–146
- probable cause or consent, 145
- reasonable suspicion distinguished from probable cause, 128
- roadblocks, 167
- border searches, for drugs, 150–151
- to check license and registration, 132–133
- Delaware v. Prouse*, 132–133, 165, 169, 171, 173
- to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, 168, 170–171
- to detect people drinking and driving, 168
- as form of seizure under Fourth Amendment, 58
- Illinois v. Lidster*, 168, 172–173
- Indianapolis v. Edmond*, 168, 170–171, 172, 173
- Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz*, 168–170, 171, 172, 173
- to seek information about a hit-and-run accident, 168, 172–173
- sobriety checkpoints, 168–170
- United States v. Martinez-Fuerte*, 169, 171, 173
- routine, *Miranda* rule not required for, 222–223
- searches of people in vehicles
- Brendlin v. California*, 165–166
- bus passenger’s freedom to decline or terminate encounter with officer, 156–158
- Delaware v. Prouse*, 165
- Florida v. Bostick*, 156–158, 163
- Maryland v. Wilson*, 145, 160–161
- no requirement to advise of right to refuse, 162–164

- officer making traffic stop may order passengers to get out of car, 160–161
- officer not required to inform bus passengers they are free not to cooperate, 162–164
- officer not required to inform detained motorists they are free to go, 161–162
- Ohio v. Robinette*, 161–162
- passengers, as well as driver, seized, 156, 165–166
- passengers traveling on public transportation, 156–158
- Pennsylvania v. Mimms*, 145, 160–161, 162
- police/citizen encounter on a bus, 156–158
- probable cause for traffic violation, with drug search resulting, 158–159
- United States v. Drayton*, 162–164
- Whren v. United States*, 158–159
- search incident to arrest, 144–145
- stops distinguished from searches, 128
- suspicionless inspections at the border, for drugs, 150–151
- Terry* stops, 145
- Terry v. Ohio*, 137
- Thornton v. United States*, 128, 151–153
- totality of circumstances test, 134–135
- United States v. Chadwick*, 143
- United States v. Cortez*, 134–135
- United States v. Flores-Montano*, 128, 150–151
- United States v. Robinson*, 134, 145
- United States v. Ross*, 128, 132, 134, 136–137, 143, 146
- warrantless inventory searches of person and possessions of arrested individuals, 139–140
- warrantless searches
 - if vehicle is readily mobile, 143–144
 - of motor homes, 138–139
 - of movable container, in absence of exigent circumstances, 131–132
 - of passenger compartment and contents of car, 133–134
 - with probable cause, 129–131
 - probable cause that container holds contraband or seizable evidence, 142–143
- Wyoming v. Houghton*, 128, 145–146
- Zurcher v. Stanford Daily*, 146
- Verbal evidence, 17
- Voice exemplar, 202–203
- Voluntary requirement, in searches with consent, 116, 118–119
- Waiver, of *Miranda* rights, 246–247, 249–250, 255–256. *See also* *Miranda* rule, cases weakening
- Wanted posters, as justification for stop and frisk, 33–34
- Warden v. Hayden* (search after arrest), 107
- Warrantless arrests
 - begins in public place/ends in private place, 50–51
 - for minor criminal offense, 49, 65–67
 - in private home, exigent circumstances required, 54–55
 - probable cause
 - of commission of crime in motor vehicle, 148–150
 - determined by police officer, 148–150
 - in public place, with probable cause, 51–53
- Warrantless entry, need to assist exception, 25–26
- Warrantless inventory searches of person and possessions of arrested individuals, 139–140
- Warrantless nighttime entry of suspect’s home for arrest for non-jailable offense, 55–56
- Warrantless nonconsensual entry, 23–24
- Warrantless searches. *See also* Vehicle stops and searches
 - “automobile exception,” 129, 156
 - of automobiles with probable cause, 129–131
 - of containers in motor vehicles, 142–143
 - of curtilage, 191–192
 - of house after arrest, 109
 - if vehicle is readily mobile, 143–144
 - justified by probable cause or exigent circumstances, 107
 - of motor homes, 138–139
 - of movable container in motor vehicle, in absence of exigent circumstances, 131–132
 - of murder scene, 86–87
 - of passenger compartment and contents of car, 133–134
 - at place of detention, 106

- with probable cause, 128
- of probationer's residence, 82, 97–98
- of shared dwelling over refusal of
 - physically present resident, 124–126
- of trash left for collection, 90–91
- Warrantless seizures
 - of evidence in plain view, 186
 - justified by probable cause or exigent circumstances, 107
 - permitted, if evidence is likely to disappear, 72–73
 - of trash left for collection, 90–91
 - validity requirements, 107
- Warrants. *See also* Arrests with a warrant
 - anticipatory, 100–102
 - arrests without, 2
 - invalid, if failing two-pronged reliability test, 5–6
 - must particularly describe person or things to be seized, 70, 76–78, 194
 - open fields searches, 186
 - particular description of place to be searched and things to be seized requirement, 70, 76–78, 82
 - plain view searches, 186
 - probable cause for arrest or search, 2
 - searches with, 2
 - searches without. *See* Warrantless searches
 - two-pronged test of *Aguilar v. Texas*, 4
 - Weeks v. United States* (exclusionary rule), 12, 13
 - Welsh v. Wisconsin* (seizure/arrest), 55–56
 - Whren v. United States* (probable cause; vehicle stops and searches), 8, 156, 158–159
 - Will v. Michigan Department of State Police* (liability), 294–295
 - Wilson v. Arkansas* (searches), 82, 92–93, 94, 95, 102
 - “Wingspan” (area of arrested person's immediate control), 106, 108–109, 114, 152
 - Winston v. Lee* (seizure/things or items), 70, 73–74
 - Wiretapping. *See* Electronic surveillance
 - Wong Sun v. United States* (exclusionary rule), 16–18, 206, 258
 - Written consent, 116
 - Wyoming v. Houghton* (vehicle stops and searches), 128, 145–146
 - Zurcher v. Stanford Daily* (searches), 85–86, 146