

# National Debates, Local Responses: The Origins of Local Concern about Immigration in the U.K. and the U.S.

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## Abstract

Theories of inter-group threat hold that local concentrations of immigrants produce resource competition and thus anti-immigrant attitudes. Variants of these theories are commonly applied to Britain as well as the U.S. Yet the empirical tests have been inconsistent. This comparative paper analyzes geo-coded surveys from both countries to identify when residents' attitudes are influenced by living near immigrant communities. Using Pew surveys of the U.S. from 2001 and 2006 and the 2005 British Election Study, it illustrates that local contextual effects hinge on national politics. Contextual effects appear primarily when immigration is a nationally salient issue, a finding which explains why past research finds threat in some cases but not others. Seemingly local disputes have national catalysts. The paper also demonstrates how panel data can reduce the selection biases that plague research on local contextual effects.

# Introduction

<sup>1</sup>In the 1970s, a native-born Briton complained about her West Indian neighbours, telling an interviewer: "There's too much noise with the foreigners... We just can't go where we want any more. Why should they get National Health Service benefits?"<sup>2</sup>For this London resident, immigrants at once fostered local concerns about neighbourhood life and national concerns about the distribution of benefits. Similar anti-immigrant sentiments were common in many parts of Britain during the 1970s, when immigration and integration were salient issues.<sup>3</sup>In recent years, these questions have reappeared on the British political agenda periodically, brought to the fore by riots, terrorist attacks, international events, migration within Europe, and the political parties.

<sup>4</sup>In several respects, the dynamics of immigration politics in the U.S. are similar. Both countries have experienced significant immigration in the last half-century, with Britain's foreign-born population increasing to 8.3 per cent in 2001 and America's foreign-born population reaching 12.5 per cent by 2000. Those figures have doubled since 1950. In both countries, immigration is not a stable component of the political agenda. It dominates public attention at certain moments and all but disappears at

<sup>1</sup>Douglas E. Schoen, *Enoch Powell and the Powellites* (New York, NY: Macmillan Press, 1977), p. 261.

<sup>2</sup>Romain Garbaye, *Getting into Local Power: The Politics of Ethnic Minorities in British and French Cities* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005); Christopher T. Husbands, *Racial Exclusionism and the City: The Urban Support of the National Front* (Boston, MA: Allen and Unwin, 1983); Schoen, *Powell and the Powellites*; Ira Katznelson, *Black Men, White Cities: Race, Politics, and Migration in the United States, 1900-30, and Britain, 1948-68* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1976); and Daniel Lawrence, *Black Migrants, White Natives: A Study of Race Relations in Nottingham* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

<sup>3</sup>Rafaela Dancygier, "The Politics of Race and Immigration in Britain: An Uneasy Balance," in John Roemer, Woojin Lee, and Karine van der Straeten (eds.), *Racism, Xenophobia, and Distribution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); John Solomos, *Race and Racism in Britain* (London, UK: Macmillan Press, 1993); Anthony M. Messina, *Race and party competition in Britain* (Clarendon Press, 1989); and John Solomos, *Black Youth, Racism, and the State: The Politics of Ideology and Policy* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

<sup>4</sup>These estimates come from the United Kingdom Statistics Authority (<http://www.statistics.gov.uk/> [accessed September 26, 2008]) and the U.S. Census Bureau ([www.census.gov](http://www.census.gov) [accessed March 17 2008]) respectively.

5others.<sup>6</sup>In 2006, the share of Americans indicating that immigration was the nation's most important problem spiked from 3 per cent in January to 19 per cent three months later.<sup>7</sup>In a 2000 survey, "race/immigration" ranked eleventh among Britons' priorities. But by May and June of 2005, immediately following the general election campaign, it ranked first, with 31 per cent naming "immigration" among the nation's two most important issues.

<sup>8</sup>Even the specific aspects of immigration that Britons and Americans highlight can be quite similar. Compare the Londoner's statement above with an anti-immigrant verse sent to a California official in the early 1990s: "everything is mucho good; soon we own the neighborhood; we have a hobby—it's called breeding; welfare pay for baby feeding."<sup>9</sup>The comments differ markedly in tone and timing, to say the least. But both demonstrate how anti-immigrant views blend local anxieties about neighbourhood takeover with national concerns about public spending and fairness.

The interplay between neighbourhood conditions and national politics captured in these comments is not coincidental. In fact, the interplay proves critical in answering this paper's research question: why does immigration emerge as a major concern in certain localities at certain moments in time? Construed broadly, research in the intergroup threat tradition explains concerns about immigrants by emphasizing objective

<sup>5</sup>Rafaela Dancygier, *Immigration and Conflict* (Ph.D. diss.) New Haven, CT, 2007; Daniel Tichenor, *Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Eliot Barkan, "Return of the Nativists? California Public Opinion and Immigration in the 1980s and 1990s," *Social Science History* 27/2 (2003), p. 229-83; Randall Hansen, *Immigration and Citizenship in Post-War Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Solomos, *Race and Racism in Britain*; John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992); and Messina, *Race and Party Competition in Britain*.

<sup>6</sup>These results come from Gallup's monthly telephone surveys.

<sup>7</sup>The first of these results comes from a MORI survey while the second comes from the British administration of the Eurobarometer. Both were accessed through Polling the Nations.

<sup>8</sup>Robert Reinhold, "A Welcome for Immigrants Turns to Resentment," *The New York Times* (1993).

<sup>9</sup>For a detailed discussion of welfare state resentments and local anti-immigrant hostility, see Geoff Dench, Kate Gavron and Michael Young, *The New East End: Kinship, Race, and Conflict* (London: Profile Books, 2006).

<sup>10</sup>conditions such as the size of local immigrant populations.<sup>11</sup>Another theoretical approach explains anti-immigrant attitudes chiefly through subjective perceptions about immigrants' impact on identity or culture. This paper seeks a middle ground. It demonstrates that in the U.K. as well as the U.S., local conditions shape attitudes in the presence of salient national rhetoric about immigration. National discussions of immigration can catalyze local political processes, calling people's attention to the immigrants in their neighbourhoods. In this view, even local concerns about the impact of immigrants on the neighbourhood are partly national in origin. Certainly, local political leaders might highlight or downplay immigration as well, giving immigration politics a different flavour in different parts of the country. But national events and national rhetoric appear to play a catalyzing role, as we do not see evidence of local differentiation in the absence of salient national rhetoric.

<sup>12</sup>The process of politicization emphasized here addresses a weakness in existing contextual theories: it explains when local experiences are likely to shape people's political views. If objective conditions alone explained local anxieties about immigration, it

<sup>10</sup>James Laurence and Anthony Heath, "Predictors of Community Cohesion: Multi-Level Modelling of the 2005 Citizenship Survey," Department for Communities and Local Government (2008); Benjamin T. Bowyer, "The Contextual Determinants of Whites' Racial Attitudes in England," *British Journal of Political Science* 39/3 (2009)[pages]: 559–586; Hilde Coff'e, Bruno Heyndels and Jan Vermeir, "Fertile grounds for extreme right-wing parties: Explaining the Vlaams Blok's electoral success," *Electoral Studies* 26/1 (2007), p. 142-57; Dancygier, *Immigration and Conflict*; Christian Dustmann and Ian Preston, "Attitudes to Ethnic Minorities, Ethnic Context and Location Decisions," *The Economic Journal* 111/April (2001); Hubert M. Blalock, *Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967); and V.O. Key, *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1949).

<sup>11</sup>John Sides and Jack Citrin, "European Opinion about Immigration: The Role of Identities, Interests, and Information," *British Journal of Political Science* 37 (2007), p. 477-504; Paul Sniderman, Louk Hagendoorn and Markus Prior, "Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities," *American Political Science Review* 98/1 (2004), p. 35-49; Joel S. Fetzer, "Economic self-interest or cultural marginality? Anti-immigration sentiment and nativist political movements in France, Germany, and the USA," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 26/1 (2002), p. 5-23; Jack Citrin et al., "Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations," *The Journal of Politics* 59/3 (1997), p. 858-881; and Jack Citrin, Donald P. Green and Beth Reingold, "American Identity and the Politics of Ethnic Change," *The Journal of Politics* 52/4 (1990), p. 1124-53.

<sup>12</sup>Politicization is defined as a process encouraging citizens to incorporate a given issue, event, or

is not obvious why we would observe the punctuated patterns of anti-immigrant mobilization that scholars frequently note. At the same time, if subjective perceptions alone explained anxieties about immigration, concern about immigration would not be concentrated in specific localities. This theoretical approach can explain why anti-immigrant contention is clustered in time and space.

The next section integrates research on immigrant contexts in the U.K. and the U.S., research that has developed in relative isolation. It contends that neither body of work explores the factors that moderate contextual effects. Put differently, past work typically focuses on whether or not contextual effects exist rather than investigating the conditions that dampen or strengthen such effects. Section 1 then develops the paper's theoretical claims by outlining the role that salient rhetoric plays in making the local context politically relevant. The resulting hypothesis holds that the effects of local context—that is, living in heavily immigrant neighbourhoods, or rapidly changing ones—will hinge on the visibility of immigration as a national issue. For example, we should expect that Britons in heavily immigrant areas will be especially concerned about immigration when the issue is in the national headlines. The local context is not inherently political, but must be made so. The theoretical section also outlines mechanisms that could induce such changes. Salient rhetoric could influence perceptions of neighbouring immigrants or it could create common knowledge that others see the issue as important.

To make inferences about contextual influence, one must overcome formidable method-

observation into their political attitudes and concerns. This definition differs only slightly from the common definition as the incorporation of an issue into party competition (at the elite level) and voting decisions (at the mass level). For one such usage, see Chapter Two of Garbaye, *Getting into Local Politics*.

<sup>13</sup> Benjamin T. Bowyer, "Local Context and Extreme Right Support in England: The British National Party in the 2002 and 2003 Local Elections," *Electoral Studies* 27/4 (2008); Dancygier, 'The Politics of Race and Immigration in Britain'; Dancygier, *Immigration and Conflict*; and Husbands, *Racial Exclusionism and the City*.

<sup>14</sup>ological challenges including measurement error and selection bias. Given the specific hypotheses being tested, one must also be attentive to the possibility that salient rhetoric emerges from local inter-group contention, and is endogenous. Section 2 presents approaches to these recurrent problems including the use of panel data where possible, the examination of demographic changes, the testing of multiple levels of aggregation, and the testing of hypotheses in multiple countries. Of the frequently cited articles on the influence of neighbourhood contexts, none has tested its claims in more than one country. If contextual effects do vary with national political conditions, studying multiple countries allows us to extend the observed variation in those conditions. And to the extent that the same hypothesis explains events in multiple countries, we have strong evidence in its favour, as Katznelson's *Black Men, White Cities* attests.

Section 2 also presents empirical tests of these claims using the importance of immigration among nationally representative survey respondents as the dependent variable. In both countries, the goal is to identify whether concerns about immigration vary across local contexts as we would expect. These empirical examples were chosen both because the salient rhetoric at the time produces non-obvious predictions and because of the availability of geo-coded surveys including "most important problem" questions. In both the U.S. and the U.K., ethnic background and immigrant status are closely correlated, but the focus throughout this paper is squarely on the influence of living near immigrants.

<sup>15</sup>The first test employs surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center at two points in time. In 2001, when immigrant inflows to the U.S. were near their peak, only four

<sup>14</sup>Ron Johnston et al., "Local Context, Retrospective Economic Evaluations, and Voting: The 1997 General Election in England and Wales," *Political Behavior* 22/2 (2000), p. 121-43; I. MacAllister et al., "Class Dealignment and the Neighborhood Effect: Miller Revisited," *British Journal of Political Science* 31 (2001), p. 41-59; Dustmann and Preston, 'Attitudes to Ethnic Minorities, Ethnic Context, and Location Decisions'; and Gary King, "Why Context Shouldn't Count," *Political Geography* 15/2 (1996), p. 159-164.

<sup>15</sup> Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *International Migration Outlook*

<sup>16</sup>of the 785 respondents cited immigrants or immigration as the most important issue facing their community. This challenges theories that see responses to immigration as a straightforward function of demographic trends. However, in early 2006, growing immigrant concentrations had become a salient issue as well as an objective fact. The 2006 survey data demonstrate that Americans in communities with growing shares of immigrants were more likely to cite immigration as a serious local problem. While some of these claims have been established using panel data on other U.S. examples,

the cross-sectional analysis presented here extends past work to explain immigration's perceived importance.

<sup>17</sup>The paper then turns to Britain. Britain represents a harder case for the hypothesis that national rhetoric shapes local responses to immigrants. As Messina<sup>18</sup> and Dancygier<sup>19</sup> demonstrate, the two dominant British parties tried to keep immigration off of the national agenda as constituent pressure grew in the 1950s and 1960s. Local events such as the 1958 riots and the 1964 Smethwick campaign forced immigration onto the national agenda rather than the reverse. In more recent times, there is still good reason to expect that concentrated immigrant populations will produce local contention in Britain irrespective of national politics. British localities oversee a significant share of local housing, providing concrete stakes that could fuel local inter-group disputes. Perhaps for that reason, scholars studying Britain find threatened responses to immigrant groups more consistently than do scholars studying the U.S. Britain appears to

(OECD, 2008); Jeffrey S. Passel and Robert Suro, *Rise, Peak, and Decline: Trends in U.S. Immigration, 1992-2004*, 2006.

<sup>16</sup>Daniel J. Hopkins, "Politicized Places: Explaining Where and When Immigrants Provoke Local Opposition," *American Political Science Review* (2010).

<sup>17</sup>Messina, *Race and Party Competition in Britain*.

<sup>18</sup>Dancygier, 'The Politics of Race and Immigration in Britain.'

<sup>19</sup>On Britain, see: Laurence and Heath, 'Predictors of Community Cohesion'; Bowyer, 'Local Context and Extreme Right Support in England'; Bowyer, 'The Contextual Determinants of Whites' Racial Attitudes in England'; Dancygier, 'The Politics of Race and Immigration in Britain'; Dancygier, *Immigration and Conflict*; and Jeanette Money, *Fences and Neighbors: The Political Geography of Immigration Control* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999). On the U.S., see: Cybelle

be a strong case for traditional theories of inter-group threat and a challenging case for theories emphasizing the national origins of local contention.

Yet even in the British case, this paper finds strong evidence that national politics shape local inter-group contention. Specifically, it uses panel data from the 2005 British Election Study (BES) to illustrate that local conditions interact with the information environment to produce concern about immigration. The 2005 campaign's focus on immigration was an exogenous shock to local immigration politics, and the 2005 BES panel is uniquely suited to isolate the impacts of that shock. Panel data are valuable in identifying contextual effects because they allow us to compare the influence of local contexts at multiple points in time and to hold many selection biases constant. Selection bias is far less credible as an explanation for how a contextual effect would grow or shrink for the same people living in the same neighbourhood at different points in time. The 2005 BES also provides unusually comprehensive contextual information at various levels of aggregation. Section 2 demonstrates that Britons living in heavily immigrant neighbourhoods grew concerned about immigration immediately after the 2005 general election campaign, a campaign that made immigration and asylum central issues. Here, too, we see the interactive effect of a changing information environment and local contexts.

To be sure, the role of immigration in British and American history differs markedly. Americans understand their country as a "nation of immigrants," a self-conception that is not found in Britain. The immigrants arriving in both countries differ as well, since many of the immigrants to the U.K. are Muslim or Eastern European while few immigrants to the U.S. are either. The evidence outlined below also suggests that the

Fox, "The Color of Welfare? How Whites' Attitudes Towards Latinos Influence Support for Welfare," *American Journal of Sociology* 110/3 (2004), p. 580-625; Bruce Cain, Jack Citrin and Cara Wong, *Ethnic Context, Race Relations, and California Politics* (San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California, 2000); and Marylee C. Taylor, "How White Attitudes Vary with the Racial Composition of Local Populations: Numbers Count," *American Sociological Review* 63 (1998), p. 512-535.

critical aspects of the local context—high levels of immigrants and rapid changes in the U.S., but only high levels in Britain—differ across the two countries. Still, immigrants in both countries become a source of local political concern primarily when salient national rhetoric and events highlight their presence and connects them to politics. Despite the differences between the two countries, there is a fundamental similarity in the processes that lead immigration to become a prominent local concern.

## 1 Theories of Contextual Influence

<sup>20</sup>By “contextual effect,” this paper means the influence of casual interactions and observations within a bounded space, a definition that draws on Huckfeldt and Sprague.

By “threat,” it means negative political attitudes or behaviours directed at a group that is viewed as distinctive in ascriptive terms such as race or national origin. As used here, “anti-immigrant contention” refers to the visible manifestations of threat directed against immigrants. Concern about immigrants’ political power, their impact on social spending, or about immigration levels are all potential precursors of threat and anti-immigrant contention. This section outlines contextual theories of the intergroup threat. It then details the limits of these theories, especially when applied to immigrants. In response, it offers a new theoretical approach contending that people politicize their local contexts only with the help of salient political rhetoric.

<sup>21</sup>Since at least V.O. Key’s research on the U.S. South, scholars have studied the influence of living near minority groups on political attitudes and behaviours. Key’s work saw inter-group conflict as a product of competition for political power and other scarce resources. It predicts that as the share of a minority group in an area rises,

<sup>20</sup>Robert Huckfeldt and John Sprague, *Citizens, Politics and Social Communication: Information and Influence in an Election Campaign* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995). “Neighbourhood effect” is a synonym.

<sup>21</sup>Key, *Southern Politics*.

and especially as it nears a threshold enabling it to contend for political power, intergroup conflict will rise as well. In Britain, anti-immigrant politician Enoch Powell advanced a similar argument, saying: "numbers are of the essence: the significance and consequences of an alien element introduced into a country or population are profoundly different according to whether that element is 1 percent or 10 percent." Threat might apply in Britain as well as the U.S., and to immigrants as well as African Americans.

Subsequent research has found variants of threat in Britain<sup>24</sup> U.S.,

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Hansen, *Immigration and Citizenship in Post-war Britain*, p. 185.  
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elsewhere in Europe. Related approaches contend that inter-group contention stems from economic competition or from a combination of economic motives and out-group animus. Although not identical, these theories locate the origins of inter-group contention in objective conditions such as demographics or labour market conditions. The specific contextual unit varies from theory to theory, but these theories commonly predict vari-

Bowyer, 'Local Context and Extreme Right Support in England'; Bowyer, 'The Contextual Determinants of Whites' Racial Attitudes in England'; Dancygier, 'The Politics of Race and Immigration in Britain'; Dustmann and Preston, 'Attitudes to Ethnic Minorities, Ethnic Context, and Location Decisions'; and Money, Fences and Neighbors.

J. Eric Oliver and Janelle Wong, "Intergroup Prejudice in Multiethnic Settings," *American Journal of Political Science* 47/4 (2003), p. 567-582; Rodney E. Hero, *Faces of Inequality: Social Diversity in American Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Taylor, 'How White Attitudes Vary with the Racial Composition of Local Populations'; James M. Glaser, "Back to the Black Belt: Racial Environment and White Racial Attitudes in the South," *Journal of Politics* 56/1 (1994), p. 2141; Michael W. Giles and Melanie A. Buckner, "David Duke and Black Threat: An Old Hypothesis Revisited," *Journal of Politics* 55/3 (1993), p. 702-713; and Gerald C. Wright, "Contextual Models of Electoral Behavior: The Southern Wallace Vote," *American Political Science Review* 71 (1977).

Coffe et al., 'Fertile grounds for extreme right-wing parties'; Lauren McLaren, "Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in Europe: Contact, Threat Perception, and Preferences for the Exclusion of Migrants," *Social Forces* 81/3 (2003); Ira N. Gang, Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz and Myeong-Su Yun, "Economic Strain, Ethnic Concentration, and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in the European Union," *Institute for the Study of Labor Discussion Paper* 578 (2002).

Kenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter, "Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 83/1 (2001), p. 133-145; Susan Olzak, *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992).  
Claudine Gay, "Seeing Difference: The Effect of Economic Disparity on Black Attitudes Toward Latinos," *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (2006), p. 982-97; Regina P. Branton and Bradford S. Jones, "Re-examining Racial Attitudes: The Conditional Relationship Between Diversity and Socioeconomic Environment," *American Journal of Political Science* 49/2 (2005), p. 359-372; and Stewart E. Tolnay and E.M. Beck, *A Festival of Violence: An Analysis of Southern Lynchings, 1882-1930* (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1995).

ation in inter-group contention across localities.

## 1.1 Challenges to Inter-group Threat

<sup>28</sup>Still, the U.S. case also offers considerable dissenting evidence. Several studies have failed to find threatened responses to immigrants or Hispanics.<sup>29</sup> These non-findings are not necessarily empirical failures: there are strong theoretical reasons why immigrants might not produce threatened responses. In the U.S., significant fractions of immigrants are not naturalized citizens and cannot vote, reducing the political threat they pose. In both the U.S. and the U.K., some immigrants' plans to return to the sending country might further limit their political mobilization,<sup>30</sup> again reducing the threat they pose. Additionally, the specific contextual unit varies from theory to theory, but most predict variation in inter-group contention across localities. Immigrant populations are often residentially segregated, limiting housing market competition and casual, day-to-day encounters. Inter-group threat might be a less consistent response to immigrant groups than is commonly assumed.

A further challenge to inter-group threat comes from its underlying assumptions. To feel threatened by an immigrant group, one must first know that the group is present in the locality and know its relative size. Put differently, theories of inter-group threat assume reasonably accurate local perceptions. Yet citizens' knowledge of local demo-

<sup>28</sup>Andrea L. Campbell, Cara Wong and Jack Citrin, "'Racial Threat,' Partisan Climate, and Direct Democracy: Contextual Effects in Three California Initiatives," *Political Behavior* 28 (2006); Fox, 'The Color of Welfare?' Jeffrey C. Dixon and Michael S. Rosenbaum, "Nice to Know You? Testing Contact, Cultural, and Group Threat Theories of Anti-Black and Anti-Hispanic Stereotypes," *Social Science Quarterly* 85/2 (2004); J. Eric Oliver and Tali Mendelberg, "Reconsidering the Environmental Determinants of White Racial Attitudes," *American Journal of Political Science* 44/3 (2000); and Taylor, 'How White Attitudes Vary with the Racial Composition of Local Populations.'

<sup>29</sup>Michael Jones-Correa, *Between Two Nations: The Political Predicament of Latinos in New York City* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Lawrence, *Black Migrants, White Natives*.

<sup>30</sup>Mary J. Fischer, "The Relative Importance of Income and Race in Determining Residential Outcomes in US Urban Areas, 1970-2000," *Urban Affairs Review* 38/5 (2003); Deborah Phillips, "Black Minority Ethnic Concentration, Segregation and Dispersal in Britain," *Urban Studies* 35/10 (1998)

<sup>31</sup>graphics is surprisingly weak, leading some scholars to question the mechanisms underpinning theories of inter-group threat.<sup>32</sup>In the U.S., one study finds that the correlation between actual and perceived neighbourhood racial composition is just 0.17.<sup>33</sup>A survey of 113 respondents conducted in February, 2008 found that Americans' guesses about the share of immigrants in their ZIP code correlated at just 0.23 with the correct figure. Theories of inter-group threat assume that demographics are a salient feature of the local context, but the survey evidence disagrees.

<sup>34</sup>The third challenge in applying inter-group threat to immigrant populations stems from the possibility that anti-immigrant animus is rooted primarily in identity rather than interests. In this view, anti-immigrant attitudes come from subjective perceptions about immigration's impact on the community or the nation. If this is correct, fears about immigration are primarily about the threat it poses to national identity and cultural cohesion.

<sup>35</sup>Scholars find considerable evidence for this claim both in the U.S.<sup>36</sup>and in Europe. As Sides and Citrin note in describing Europe, "attitudes towards immigrants have become increasingly divorced from social reality; that is, people's perceptions of

<sup>31</sup>See especially Cara Wong, *Objective vs. Subjective Context: Questions about the Mechanism Linking Racial Context to Political Attitudes*, 2008 and Cara Wong, "Little and Big Pictures in Our Heads: Race, Local Context, and Innumeracy about Racial Groups in the U.S.," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 71 (2007).

<sup>32</sup>Ted Chiricos, Michael Hogan and Marc Gertz, "Racial Composition of the Neighborhood and Fear of Crime," *Criminology* 35 (1997).

<sup>33</sup>Daniel J. Hopkins, Van C. Tran and Abigail Fisher Williamson, *See No Spanish: Language, Local Context, and Attitudes toward Immigration*, 2010.

<sup>34</sup>Empirical analyses in this vein typically focus on the nation as the threatened unit, but there are arguments that emphasize local identity as well. See especially John Horton, *The Politics of Diversity: Immigration, Resistance, and Change in Monterey Park, California* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1995).

<sup>35</sup>Citrin et al., 'Public Opinion towards Immigration Reform'; Higham, *Strangers in the Land*; and Citrin et al. 'American Identity and the Politics of Ethnic Change.'

<sup>36</sup>Sides and Citrin, 'European Opinion about Immigration,'; Fetzer, 'Economic self-interest or cultural marginality?'; and Sniderman et al., 'Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers.' For parallel claims about African Americans in the U.S., see Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders, *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996), Chapter 4.

<sup>37</sup>immigration and immigrants come to rely more on vivid events... and messages from politicians and media.”<sup>38</sup>Here, the geographic frame of reference is itself subjective: cultural threat could operate locally, regionally, or nationally depending on how people conceive of the threat posed by immigrants. This alternate, culturally rooted view of anti-immigrant contention was given voice in Britain by Margaret Thatcher among others. She told an interviewer that the British were “afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a different culture.”<sup>39</sup>From an academic viewpoint, Huntington makes a similar argument in the U.S.

<sup>40</sup>The cultural threat approach raises new questions that have yet to be answered. If perceptions of immigration’s cultural impact dominate concerns about economic or political impacts, what leads long-time residents to deem immigrants a threat at some moments but not others? Put differently, what explains the sudden punctuations in attention to immigration as an issue? One might speculate that whether immigrants are perceived as a threat to the nation will hinge on the attention they receive in national political discourse and on how their impact is framed in that discourse.<sup>41</sup>If politicians and journalists are ignoring the issue of immigration, it is harder for long-time residents to conceive of immigration as a threat to the nation.

<sup>37</sup>Sides and Citrin, ‘European Opinion about Immigration,’ p. 501

<sup>38</sup>Hansen, Immigration and Citizenship in Post-war Britain, p. 210.

<sup>39</sup>Samuel Huntington, Who Are We? America’s National Identity and the Challenges it Faces (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2004).

<sup>40</sup>Here, we define frames as conceptual frameworks that “define what the problem is and how to think about it,” following Donald R. Kinder, “Communication and Opinion,” Annual Review of Political Science 1 (1998), p. 170.

<sup>41</sup>Although the make-up of the immigrant population is an alternative explanation, it changes too slowly to explain the relatively swift shifts in concern about immigration. For more, see David Card, Christian Dustmann and Ian Preston, Understanding Attitudes to Immigration: The Migration and Minority Module of the First European Social Survey, 2005.

## 1.2 Positing an Interaction

At first glance, the two major bodies of theorizing appear to differ sharply in their assumptions as well as their predictions. Theories of inter-group threat emphasize the role of objective conditions—usually local—in generating political contention between groups. Theories based on culture instead highlight subjective perceptions of immigration's impact on identity and culture. The theories also fall short in different ways. Theories of inter-group threat fail to acknowledge that many people do not accurately perceive their local contexts, while theories of cultural threat do not explain the sources of threats or why threat perception varies. Still, elements of the two approaches can be synthesized into a theory that addresses these defects—and that is capable of explaining both cross-sectional and longitudinal variation.

<sup>42</sup>The updated theory, dubbed the theory of politicized places, contends that local inter-group contention is the product of two factors operating at different geographic scales. As theories of inter-group threat suggest, the first is the local demographic context, meaning either significant shares of immigrants or increasing shares of immigrants.<sup>43</sup><sup>44</sup>Long-time residents might fear a large out-group population because of concerns about resource competition, while they might fear sudden changes because of their impact on home values or concerns about the neighbourhood's future.<sup>45</sup>But since people only pay close attention to their local environments on occasion, the updated theory also requires a politicizing agent which encourages people to connect their day-to-day observations to politics. That is where salient political rhetoric comes in. It calls attention to certain aspects of people's contexts or day-to-day lives, leading them

<sup>42</sup>On shares of an out-group, see Key, *Southern Politics*. On changing population shares, see Donald P. Green, Dara Z. Strolovitch and Janelle S. Wong, "Defended Neighborhoods, Integration, and Racially Motivated Crime," *American Journal of Sociology* 104/2 (1998).

<sup>43</sup>Ingrid Ellen Gould, *Sharing America's Neighborhoods: The Prospects for Stable Racial Integration* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).

<sup>44</sup>Horton, *The Politics of Diversity*.

<sup>45</sup>Kinder, 'Communication and Opinion'; and Diana C. Mutz, "Contextualizing Personal Experience:

to update their political views in light of local experiences. This is an information-based approach, so the relevant geographic unit is the neighbourhood in which people observe immigrants or have casual encounters with them.

<sup>46</sup>The process of politicization might work through two mechanisms. The first is psychological. People are exposed to thousands of pieces of information in their everyday lives which might be politically relevant, from the cost of milk to signs in foreign languages. Salient political rhetoric could serve a priming role,<sup>47</sup> indicating which of those thousands of observations should influence one's opinions. At the same time, salient political rhetoric might play a sociological role by promoting common knowledge<sup>48</sup> and encouraging conversations and political mobilization on specific issues. After being exposed to anti-immigration political rhetoric, people might be more willing to discuss the issue with neighbours or might have added confidence in expressing their views. Such social reinforcement could be especially important on sensitive issues of ethnicity or race, where people initially fear social sanctions for introducing a difficult topic. As a theoretical starting point, this paper does not differentiate between political rhetoric that is salient because of journalists' attention and rhetoric that is salient because of political elites themselves, although that distinction could prove valuable in future work.

<sup>49</sup>Both mechanisms lead to the prediction that people will respond to the same contextual experiences in very different ways depending on the issues that are salient in national politics. In this view, inter-group threat is one potential response to the

The Role of Mass Media," *The Journal of Politics* 56/3 (1994).

<sup>46</sup>Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder, *News that Matters* (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

<sup>47</sup>Michael Chwe, *Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

<sup>48</sup>Benoit Monin and Dale T. Miller, "Moral Credentials and the Expression of Prejudice," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 81/1 (2001); Tali Mendelberg, *The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

<sup>49</sup>For simplicity, this analysis assumes that the salience of national politics outweighs that of subnational politics. But the same argument applies to salient rhetoric at all levels of a political system, from state governments in the U.S. to the governments in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

<sup>50</sup>presence of a significant immigrant community, but it is not a necessary response. At times when immigration issues are politically salient, long-time residents might indeed feel competition with neighbouring immigrants. They might connect their immigrant neighbours with their difficulties finding a job. But when immigration is not a major issue, people might not draw political conclusions from the presence of immigrants next door. In short, the influence of local contexts is moderated by national information environments.

<sup>51</sup>Clearly, attention to immigration does not always move from national politics to local politics. In the U.S. case, one might point to the mid-1990s as a counter-example, since immigration's salience in California helped place it on the national agenda. Money argues that in Britain, immigration became salient nationally precisely because of rising anti-immigrant sentiment in swing constituencies.<sup>52</sup> Similarly, Solomos and Black contend that the politics of race in Birmingham were influenced both by national developments and by local political developments as well. These findings make Britain an especially informative test of the politicized places approach. The theory of politicized places does not rule out these channels of local influence on national politics, but it does emphasize the reverse: that national rhetoric helps focus people's attention on certain aspects of day-to-day life. The next section details the research design, and pays particular attention to designs that can sort between these alternative approaches.

<sup>50</sup>The notion of salience is invoked in both research on agenda-setting and political psychology, and here refers to the relative attention political elites pay to various issues in their public statements and actions.

<sup>51</sup>Money, *Fences and Neighbors*, Chapter 4.

<sup>52</sup>John Solomos and Les Black, *Race, Politics and Social Change* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1995).

## 2 Testing the National-Local Interaction

The national-local interaction posited above could shape a variety of opinions about immigrants and immigration policy. But it is not always clear in what direction opinions will move, as one could imagine salient rhetoric calling attention to positive local experiences as well as negative ones. These analyses thus focus on concern about the issue of immigration as their dependent variable, allowing us to sidestep questions about the specific content of people's views. In the U.S. and then the U.K., the analyses examine whether people in places with many immigrants or growing immigrant populations become more concerned about immigration.

To reduce concerns about endogeneity or reverse causation, we must clearly differentiate the explanatory and dependent variables. One key explanatory variable is salient national rhetoric, defined as the topics discussed by politicians and journalists. Since national rhetoric operates relatively evenly throughout a given country, this factor varies over time rather than across space. Our goal is to explain local variations in concern about immigration among the public. It might seem that we are explaining immigration's salience among the public with salience among political elites, and that reverse causation is a major alternative explanation. But the core hypothesis is more subtle. It holds that salience among political elites produces predictable cross-sectional variation in the salience of immigration among long-time residents. For the causal arrow to run in the opposite direction, national elites would have to be paying disproportionate attention to increasingly immigrant areas in setting the agenda. This makes reverse causation less plausible as an alternative explanation in the U.S. case. And through the careful examination of the British panel data, we can also eliminate or restrict alternative explanations emphasizing the activities of local elites.

Even when scholars agree on the definition of a contextual effect, methodological

<sup>53</sup>problems remain. The most common approach is to define the context as the available geographic unit in which a survey respondent lives, and then to use multiple regression or related statistical techniques to test whether the share of immigrants in one's locality predicts her attitudes. At least three methodological problems plague such an approach. First, there are two different selection processes, as the survey respondents have selected their place of residence and immigrant groups have selected theirs. Either process could confound contextual effects estimated in this way. Also, there is likely to be substantial measurement error, as aggregate units defined for administrative purposes rarely are coterminous with the neighbourhoods that structure people's everyday lives.

This paper confronts these challenges by using multiple strategies and data sets. By confirming the same basic patterns with different surveys collected in different nations, it hopes to overcome the potential biases inherent in any one survey. These findings are not driven by the idiosyncrasies of settlement patterns in either country. Another methodological approach is to look for changes in contextual effects over time, as doing so removes selection biases that are constant over time. A third is to use panel data where possible, since we can observe whether a contextual measure becomes a stronger predictor of attitudes after an exogenous shock. Yet another strategy is to use the smallest contextual unit available and to use multiple contextual units where possible, reducing the measurement error inherent in our estimates.

<sup>53</sup>See Johnston et al. 'Local Context, Retrospective Economic Evaluations, and Voting'; MacAllister et al. 'Class Dealignment and the Neighborhood Effect'; Dustmann and Preston, 'Attitudes to Ethnic Minorities, Ethnic Context, and Location Decisions'; and King, 'Why Context Shouldn't Count.'

## 2.1 The U.S. from 2001 to 2006

<sup>54</sup>In the U.S., earlier work has provided initial tests of these hypotheses. That research demonstrated that Americans in rapidly changing communities—communities that were seeing increases in their share of foreign-born residents—were notably less supportive of immigration. But that relationship held only during the early 1990s and in 2006, when immigration was a topic of national debates. It did not hold in 1998, 2000, 2004, or 2009, when immigration was less prominent. Using panel data over the September 11th terrorist attacks, that research also demonstrated that respondents in changing counties or ZIP codes adopted more anti-immigrant views. However, those local patterns faded several months later along with the salience of immigration itself. Even for the same individuals, contextual effects appear to vary with time. In short, there is already evidence that whether contexts are politicized matters in the U.S.

<sup>55</sup>This paper extends that evidence by focusing on a new dependent variable: levels of concern about immigration as a problem. Doing so enables us to make direct comparisons with the British quasi-experiment that is the focus of this paper. Pew Research Center surveys from 2001 and 2006 allow us to examine the impact of demographics on local concerns about immigration and subject the theory to additional tests. Looking at the period from 1990 to 2004, A report from the Pew Hispanic Center<sup>56</sup>estimates that total annual migration to the U.S. from legal and illegal sources peaked in 1999/2000 before declining. If local concerns about immigrants grew in a straightforward fashion out of demographics, we should have expected many Americans to express concerns about immigrants during that same period. The Pew survey in February 2001 gave Americans an opportunity to voice their concerns, asking an open-ended question

<sup>54</sup>Hopkins, 'Politicized Places.'

<sup>55</sup>Passel and Suro, Rise, Peak, and Decline.

<sup>56</sup>The International Migration Outlook confirms that annual immigrant inflows to the U.S. declined by 0.8 per cent from 2000 to 2006. OECD, p. 41.

<sup>57</sup>about the most important problem facing their communities. Of the 785 respondents, only four named immigration (0.5 per cent). Threat is not purely a question of numbers.

<sup>58</sup>Economic conditions were not identical in 2001 and 2006, but neither was an especially likely time to foster anti-immigrant sentiment. The unemployment rate throughout the spring of 2006—4.7 per cent according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics—was only half a percentage point above the 4.2 per cent recorded in February 2001. Moreover, in 2006, the unemployment rate had been falling consistently for more than two years, while unemployment had risen slightly into 2001. If national attention to immigration was driven by economic conditions, the peak of 6.3 per cent unemployment in June 2003 seems like a more likely time for immigration to take centre stage than 2006.

<sup>59</sup>What made 2006 distinctive was chiefly the salience of immigration as a national political issue, as Figure 1 makes clear. It presents monthly counts of articles mentioning “immigration” or “immigrants” in USA Today, the most widely read American newspaper. Articles about immigration in countries other than the U.S. were excluded. Immigration began to generate headlines in December of 2005 following Congressional action, and grew more salient during the pro-immigrant marches in March, April, and May of that year. In a 2006 Pew survey, 19 per cent of respondents called immigration “a very big problem in my local community” and 42 per cent deemed it a big national problem. The percentage naming immigration as the single most important local problem increased fivefold, from 0.5 per cent in 2001 to 2.7 per cent in 2006. This section focuses on the 2006 survey, since it alone asked whether immigration was a big problem in respondents’ local communities. But we know from the 2001 survey that only a

<sup>57</sup>Both the 2001 and 2006 Pew surveys are available for download at: <http://peoplepress.org/dataarchive/> [accessed October 4, 2008]. For the 2006 survey, which is our focus here, the AAPOR RR1 response rate was 25.2%.

<sup>58</sup>See [www.bls.gov](http://www.bls.gov) [accessed 9 November 2008].

<sup>59</sup>USA Today coverage of immigration also correlates highly with coverage on television channels such as Fox News (Pearson’s correlation of 0.73) and CBS News (Pearson’s correlation of 0.69), making it an effective metric of media attention overall.

handful of people were worried about immigration as a local problem at that point in time.

<sup>60</sup>The 2006 survey included a nationally representative sample with 1,687 respondents born in the U.S. who are non-Hispanic whites or African Americans.<sup>61</sup>830 of these respondents answered the question about immigration as a local problem. Although the U.S. Census is only conducted every 10 years, county-level demographic information from the 2006 American Community Survey (ACS) is available for 70 per cent of these respondents, allowing us to reduce measurement error by using contextual measures that reflect recent population movements.<sup>62</sup>Missing data for contextual and other variables were multiply imputed,<sup>63</sup>although we obtain the same substantive results through listwise deletion.<sup>64</sup>These same results also hold when using older, ZIP code-based contextual measures from the decennial census.<sup>65</sup>The Pearson's correlation between the per cent immigrant at the county level and at the ZIP level was 0.83 in 2000, indicating the higher level of aggregation does not substantially impact measurement. This figure is markedly higher than the 0.<sup>66</sup>Pearson's correlation for the percent African American, and likely indicates immigrants' concentration in certain areas of the U.S.<sup>66</sup>and their relative residential integration within those areas.

To better gauge the impact of local demographics, the analysis used an ordered probit to model the factors making respondents more likely to say that immigration

<sup>60</sup>196 respondents born outside the U.S., 103 U.S.-born Hispanics and 14 U.S.-born Asian Americans were removed owing to the possibility that these groups might respond to neighbouring immigrants in very different ways. The results are not sensitive to this choice.

<sup>61</sup>Currently, the ACS samples many but not all U.S. localities.

<sup>62</sup>Gary King et al., "Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data: An Alternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation," *American Political Science Review* 95/1 (2001).

<sup>63</sup>10% of respondents fail to provide their income, for example. In total, 41% of the respondents would be lost to listwise deletion.

<sup>64</sup>The median U.S. county had 250,000 residents as of 2000, making these large contextual units. By contrast, the median ZIP code had just 22,300 residents.

<sup>65</sup>William H. Frey, *Diversity Spreads Out: Metropolitan Shifts in Hispanic, Asian, and Black Populations Since 2000* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006).

<sup>66</sup>Fischer, 'The Relative Importance of Income and Race in Determining Residential Outcomes in U.S. Urban Areas, 1970-2000.'

<sup>67</sup>was “a very big problem.” Formally, an ordered probit models a latent continuous variable  $Y^*$  as  $Y^* = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_1 + \dots + \beta_k x_k + u_i$ , where  $u_i = x_i \beta$ ,  $x_i$  is a vector of the 16 covariates listed below for observation  $i$ , and where  $y_i$  belongs to category  $j$  if it falls between cutpoints  $t_{j-1}$  and  $t_j$ . Given the dependent variable, there are four categories and three estimated cutpoints. Note that this is not a multilevel model: with only an average of 5.8 respondents per county, using county fixed-effects or multilevel modeling would overfit the data, making it impossible to recover contextual effects.

<sup>68</sup>The individual-level independent variables include the respondent’s ideology, partisanship, income, employment status, age, race, sex, and education.<sup>69</sup>At the county level, the models include the per cent immigrant, the per cent with a college degree, the per cent black, and the log of the median household income, all measured through the 2000 census. The models also include the changes in each contextual estimate from 2000 to 2006. The online appendix details the question wording for the dependent variable and select independent variables; Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. These basic models avoid conditioning on attitudinal variables such as subjective economic perceptions or cultural concerns, since such attitudes could easily be endogenous to one’s level of concern about immigration. However, robustness checks confirm that the results are substantively identical when conditioning on respondents’ assessment of their own or their community’s economic prospects.

From the ordered probit model, we can estimate the probability that a respondent’s answer would fall into the most concerned category. If an otherwise average respondent lives in an area where the immigrant population shrunk by 2/10s of a percentage point,

<sup>67</sup>One finds substantively similar results analyzing the question about the most important problem facing the community despite the reduced variation in response categories.

<sup>68</sup>Partisanship indicates a seven-category partisan identification question. Income is the respondent’s total annual family income.

<sup>69</sup>They are similarly robust when conditioning on respondents’ answer to the question, “most recent immigrants do or do not learn English within a reasonable amount of time,” which is related to conceptions of cultural threat.

the probability that she calls immigration a very big local problem is 10.7 per cent. Had the same respondent lived in a county where the immigrant population grew by 3.2 percentage points between 2000 and 2006, she would have called immigration a very big local problem 25.1 per cent of the time. Put differently, when shifting from a county at the 10th percentile in terms of its changing immigrant population to one at the 90th percentile, the probability of responding in the most concerned category more than doubles. Holding continuous variables at their means and ordinal variables at their medians, we find that those living in counties with growing immigrant populations in 2006 were far more likely to be concerned about immigration. The same is true for people living in counties with large baseline immigrant populations, with an effect of similar magnitude. To the extent that selection bias influences these results, it likely drives them downward, since some subset of people who are especially worried about immigration's impacts might select away from heavily or increasingly immigrant areas.

Given the prominence of resource competition as an alternative explanation, it is worth devoting special attention to economic variables as potential confounders. The initial models condition on the respondent's education and income as well as aggregated measures of education and median household income and their changes from 2000 to 2006. To ensure the results' robustness, the analysis then added the 2005 county-level unemployment rate and its change from 2005 to 2006 to better capture local economic conditions. Using an interaction term, we learn that those with full-time jobs are actually less responsive to the changing local context than are other respondents. The other variables have little influence, either on their own or interacting with the measure of local inflows of immigrants. Economic threat does little to explain these findings.

Returning to the main model, Figure 2 depicts the first differences for each independent variable when holding other variables at their means or medians. Each dot represents the estimated change in the probability of being very concerned about im-

migration when the variable in question moves from its 10th percentile to its 90th percentile. The lines represent 95 per cent confidence intervals for these changed probabilities. The figure makes it clear that the share of immigrants in 2000 and changes in that metric from 2000 to 2006 are the strongest predictors of increased local concern about immigration. At a time when immigration was a prominent national topic of debate, the presence of many immigrants or growing numbers of immigrants in the area produced concerns about immigration's local impact as well. Given national attention to the issue, local contexts can indeed generate threatened responses. But as we saw in 2001, demographic changes alone are not always threatening. Nor are large local immigrant populations.

## 2.2 2005 British Election

<sup>70</sup>The idea of an interaction between salient political rhetoric—typically at the national level—and local experiences has precursors in qualitative research about anti-immigrant politics in Britain.<sup>71</sup>In their narratives, Hewitt, Solomos, and Husbands illustrate how groups mobilize locally in response to national rhetoric and shifts in national politics. Husbands, for example, points out that the National Front's "fortune has risen and fallen according to the occurrence of race-related events, and in particular, to the type of coverage these events have been given by the media." This section provides a test of whether local-national interactions can explain which Britons are especially concerned about immigration.

This section employs BES panel data collected during the 2005 general election campaign in Britain to confront these possibilities and test the argument in an unlikely

<sup>70</sup>Roger Hewitt, *White Backlash and the Politics of Multiculturalism* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Solomos and Back, *Race, Politics, and Social Change*, Solomos, *Race and Racism in Britain*; and Husbands, *Racial Exclusionism and the City*.

<sup>71</sup>Husbands, *Racial Exclusionism and the City*, p. 8.

case. It shows that contextual effects vary systematically in a period of months, making explanations based on economic conditions or other slow-moving variables less likely. At the same time, these data allow us to rule out several key alternative explanations based on selection bias and endogeneity. By observing the same respondents before and after the exposure to significant rhetoric about immigration, we can identify whether contexts become a stronger predictor of concern about immigration. Most selection processes are held constant in such a design, since they cannot explain the change in a contextual influence. Also, attitudes observed after the campaign cannot explain the salience of rhetoric during the campaign, reducing concerns about the endogeneity of political rhetoric. The dependent variable is whether respondents report that “immigration” or “asylum” is the most important problem facing Britain.

<sup>72</sup>Figure 3 demonstrates the research design underpinning these analyses. The two dotted lines indicate the number of respondents interviewed by day both before and after the election. In total, 3,589 respondents were interviewed prior to the election, and 2,959 of those respondents were re-interviewed afterward. We see from the figure that the vast majority of the pre-election interviews took place prior to the 11 April announcement of the election, and the vast majority of post-election interviews were completed within two months of the 5 May election. Virtually all were prior to the 7/7 terrorist attacks. In these analyses, all interviews were face-to-face.

<sup>73</sup>The solid line in Figure 3 indicates the number of news stories by week mentioning “race,” “immigration,” “immigrants,” or “asylum.”<sup>74</sup>As other researchers have noted, elite attention to immigration spiked during the early phase of the campaign. (It also

<sup>72</sup>The AAPOR RR1 response rate for the first wave was 60.5%. Of those interviewed in the pre-election wave, the post-election RR1 response rate was 87.6%.

<sup>73</sup>Specifically, it reflects the number of articles in a sample of roughly 100 British newspapers available through Lexis-Nexis.

<sup>74</sup>Dennis Kavanagh and David Butler, *The British General Election of 2005* (New York, NY: Macmillan, 2005) and Paul Whiteley et al., “The Issue Agenda and Voting in 2005,” in Pippa Norris and Christopher Wlezien (eds.), *Britain Votes 2005* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

<sup>75</sup>briefly spiked prior to the pre-election interviews, but since we capture that increased attention in our baseline survey, it does not invalidate inferences about changing contextual influence.) In part, that was driven by the Conservative Party's election theme, "Are you thinking what we're thinking?" which was thought by some to be a subtle attempt to evoke unease about immigration. This type of politics, which attempts to send signals to one constituency that go unheeded by another, earned the name "dog-whistle politics." The notion that the Tories were trying to appeal to racial sentiment was reinforced by their hiring of Lynton Crosby, a strategist who had previously used immigration in Australian campaigns. Alongside concerns about asylum, the immigration issue tapped concerns about terrorism and about the Eastern European migrants who arrived following the 2004 expansion of the European Union.

<sup>76</sup>Irrespective of the Conservatives' intentions, immigration and asylum issues became central in the early part of the campaign.<sup>77</sup>This allows us to compare the same respondents living in the same neighbourhoods before and after exposure to national rhetoric on issues of asylum and immigration. It is important to clarify that the dependent variable is not a respondent's vote choice, as other issues could easily have intervened in voters' decisions about whether to vote and for whom. Indeed, there is evidence that they did: both The Economist and ICM surveys suggest that immigration and asylum were not voters' most important issue, and that the issue's salience did not provide an overall boost to the Conservatives. Here, we are instead asking a narrower question about the changing relationship between local contexts and respondents' concern about immigration.

Contextual data are available at a variety of levels of aggregation, from Lower Level

<sup>75</sup>Philip Gould, "Labour's Political Strategy," in Dominic Wring, Jane Gren, Roger Mortimore, and Simon Atkinson (eds.), *Political Communications: The General Election Campaign of 2005* (New York: Macmillan, 2007) and Kavanagh and Butler, *The British General Election of 2005*.

<sup>76</sup>Kavanagh and Butler, *The British General Election of 2005*.

<sup>77</sup>The Economist, *How immigration played* (May 14 2005); <http://www.icmresearch.co.uk> [accessed September 18 2009].

<sup>78</sup>Super Output Areas with an average of 1,513 people to electoral wards with an average of 5,909 and Parliamentary constituencies with an average of 91,387. We can thus compare respondents at multiple levels of aggregation as well. Note that because the data include respondents from 909 separate local output areas, there is an average of just 2.6 respondents per output area. This means that multilevel models with random effects at the output area would obscure which local factors were correlated with respondents' attitudes.

<sup>79</sup>The dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether the respondent deemed immigration or asylum the most important issue facing the country. The exact question wording for this and select other questions is available in the online appendix. The individual-level independent variables include the respondent's sex, age, educational level, and income as well as indicator variables for unskilled workers, respondents receiving Jobseekers' or unemployment assistance, Conservative identifiers, and Labour identifiers. To account for respondents' subjective perceptions of economic insecurity, the model included both their assessment of their own economic situation over the last year and the nation's. The model also accounts for respondents' cultural concerns about immigration by using their agreement or disagreement that "immigrants make Britain more open to new ideas and cultures." To prevent confounding, all of the independent variables are drawn from responses to the pre-campaign survey. In substantive terms, the results are identical with or without the three attitudinal measures. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all variables included in the model.

At the neighbourhood level—operationalized here as the Lower Level Super Output Area—the model includes the per cent with high qualifications (well educated), the per

<sup>78</sup>Ron Johnston and Rich Harris, Neighbourhood Data to be used with the 2005 British Election Study, 2006.

<sup>79</sup>Respondents' educational level was measured by sorting 18 qualifications/degrees into eight ordered categories. The results reported below are robust to including each of the categories as indicator variables as well.

80cent of the economically active who are in routine or semi-routine occupations, the per cent of lone or single parent households, the per cent unemployed, the per cent over 65, the population density, the share born abroad, and the inflow of immigrants in the prior year. We restrict the sample to white Britons living in England and Wales, which leaves us with 2,386 respondents.<sup>81</sup>Some of these measures have considerable numbers of missing responses: 12.9% of respondents declined to report their income and 11.8% declined to report their party affiliation. Given the overall pattern of missing data, listwise deletion would eliminate 34.8% of the respondents, so here again, missing data are multiply imputed. In this case, the dependent variable is binary, so the estimating equation is a logistic regression of the form:

$$p_i = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-x_i\beta)}$$

is the probability that the binary outcome  $y_i$  is 1 for respondent  $i$ .  $x_i$

where  $p_i$

is a vector of the individual-level and neighbourhood-level covariates listed above and in Table 2.

The results from separate models for the pre-election and post-election responses are shown in Figure 4. (Table 4 in the online appendix contains the full fitted model.) Consider the solid lines first. For the pre-election data, we fit a logistic regression predicting whether the respondent calls “immigration” or “asylum” Britain’s most important issue. For each independent variable, we then estimated the difference in the expected outcome as the independent variable shifts from its 10th percentile to its 90th, holding others constant. This change in probability is a first difference. The dot indicates the average first difference across 10,000 simulations, and the solid line represents its 95 per cent confidence interval. We see, for example, that the first difference for the

<sup>80</sup>Contextual data for low levels of aggregation are not available for respondents living in Scotland.  
<sup>81</sup>Very similar substantive results appear when we restrict the analysis to fully observed respondents.

change in the per cent immigrant is almost exactly zero, indicating that this variable has little predictive power in the pre-election data. The local per cent immigrant in the pre-election period is positive but very close to zero, indicating that we cannot make strong statements about its influence.

However, the post-election results tell a different story, as demonstrated by dotted lines. After the election, we see that the percent immigrant in the neighbourhood becomes a significant predictor of thinking that immigration is the most important problem. Shifting from a neighbourhood at the 10th percentile (1.6 per cent born abroad) to a neighbourhood at the 90th percentile (11.4 per cent born abroad), we see a 5.2 percentage point increase in the probability of naming immigration the most important issue on average. The confidence interval runs from 1.5 percentage points to 9.0 percentage points. Once the campaign had ended, there is consistent evidence that those respondents in heavily immigrant neighbourhoods were significantly more concerned about immigration. Moreover, that had not been the case just months before. Thus we cannot attribute the contextual effect to straightforward selection bias, or to any other alternative causal factor that acted prior to the campaign itself.

<sup>82</sup>Comparing the estimated effects before and after the campaign, we see stable influences in most cases. The technique does confirm our expectation that people who initially identified with Labour would become less concerned about immigration relative to other respondents over the course of the campaign ( $p=0.01$ , one-sided test). This is no surprise: the Conservative emphasis on immigration was likely to shift attitudes among the non-identified or among Conservatives more than among Labour identifiers. The technique of comparing impacts at two different points in time detects effects where we expect them and does not detect many effects where we would not.

The true test of the hypothesis of a national-local interaction lies in the extent to

<sup>82</sup>John R. Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

<sup>83</sup>which contextual effects change over the course of the election. The left side of Figure 5 plots the change in predicted probabilities when shifting to a heavily immigrant neighbourhood during the pre-campaign period. Context has virtually no predictive power. The middle figure demonstrates the comparable estimate in the post-campaign period, when respondents have just been exposed to sustained rhetoric on immigration. There, we do see a marked effect averaging 5.2 percentage points. The p-value for the test that this effect is positive is 0.003. At right, we see the difference-in-difference estimate when we subtract the post-election estimated effect from the pre-election estimated effect. The p-value of 0.01 indicates that in only 1.1 per cent of simulations is the contextual effect of living near many immigrants stronger before the election. In the span of a few months, contexts can be politicized.

<sup>84</sup>Certainly, one might worry that this result stems from some idiosyncrasy of the data collection or model specification. However, the pattern of results holds very consistently when we include any one of 18 additional neighbourhood-level measures, from the per cent under 15 to the per cent without a car. They also hold up when conditioning on the share of Labour's vote in the constituency in the 2001 election, a fact which rules out the alternative explanation that local differences are driven by aggregate partisanship.

<sup>83</sup>Specifically, this figure is created using the two logistic regression models, one fit to the pre-election data and the second fit to the post-election data. In each case, we simulate 10,000 sets of coefficients from their estimated joint distribution to account for model-based uncertainty. With these coefficients, we can then simulate the influence of shifting the local context from its 10th percentile to its 90th percentile while holding other variables constant. This procedure yields simulated changes in the probability of naming immigration as the most important problem. The distributions in Figure 5 deviate from the normal distribution both because of the simulation and because they reflect changes in bounded probabilities.

<sup>84</sup>Specifically, these additional robustness tests included the per cent with no qualifications, the per cent in the lowest socioeconomic group, the per cent first-time voters, the per cent without children, the per cent in poor health, the per cent working part-time, the per cent full-time students, the per cent professional/managerial, the per cent in skilled trades, the per cent in agriculture, the per cent in manufacturing, the per cent of households with a lone pensioner, the per cent of households with fewer than one person per room, the per cent of households with no central heating, the per cent of households without a car, and the per cent of the economically active in highly paid professions. The per cent non-white is very highly correlated with the per cent born outside the U.K. (0.87), meaning that we cannot distinguish empirically between ethnic differences and immigrant/native differences.

<sup>85</sup>The only variable that obscures its influence is the per cent Black, which correlates with the per cent foreign born at 0.72. The result is also robust when we remove any of the measures of skills or economic deprivation, since there are several such measures in the model. One might also worry that these findings are driven by London, the most diverse metropolis in the United Kingdom. But even excluding the capital city, the results remain robust. They are also robust when using the larger census wards or Parliamentary constituencies as the geographic unit.

### 2.3 Local Campaigns or National Information?

<sup>86</sup>An additional concern is that these results are confounded by local campaigns, and by variations in information environments across England and Wales. One might point to the 2005 example of Margaret Hodge, a Labour MP from Barking who gave voice to constituent concerns around immigration—and in doing so, raised the profile of the issue nationally. One might also point to a 2005 Conservative campaign letter sent to South Dorset voters that calculated the local cost of Labour’s “chaotic asylum system” at more than one million pounds.<sup>87</sup>Certainly, the conceptualization of a single, nationally driven information environment across England and Wales is an over-simplification. Issues emerge from certain constituencies, and the parties target their appeals to certain constituencies. The 2005 campaign in particular was targeted, with the parties competing very differently across the constituencies. Nonetheless, when we condition on the

<sup>85</sup>Given recent research by Bowyer demonstrating that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis produce threat most consistently, it is worth noting that in these data, both the per cent South Asian and the per cent Black are independent, positive predictors of indicating that immigration is Britain’s most important problem. The coefficient for the per cent black is significant (with a t statistic of 2.13) while the coefficient for the per cent South Asian is not ( $t=1.35$ ). The same groups do not always drive contextual effects, it seems. See Bowyer, ‘Local Context and Extreme Right Support in England’ and Bowyer, ‘The Determinants of Whites’ Racial Attitudes in England’ for related work.

<sup>86</sup>The Economist, How immigration played.

<sup>87</sup>Jennifer Van Heerde, “Political Communication: Party Advertising in the General Elections,” in Dominic Wring, Jane Green, Roger Mortimore, and Simon Atkinson (eds.), *Political Communications: The General Election Campaign of 2005* (New York: Macmillan, 2007).

<sup>88</sup>log of total campaign spending by constituency,<sup>89</sup>which should measure the intensity of local campaigning, we find the same results as reported above. Similarly, we do not see an interaction where the effects of the percent immigrant are stronger or weaker in the most competitive constituencies. Voters are responding to immigrant neighbours similarly in the most and least competitive constituencies, a fact which weighs against the alternative explanation that these effects are driven locally. Certainly, local elites are likely to mobilise on immigration to differing extents, but we see few traces of their efforts in the pre-election period.

<sup>90</sup>On the other hand, if local contexts are in fact politicized by national events rather than local activities, we should expect people who paid close attention to the campaign to be especially susceptible to environmental influence. Respondents were asked if they had seen “any of the Party Election Broadcasts that were shown on television during the election campaign.” 68 per cent of respondents in our sample said yes. Among those respondents, the contextual effect of shifting from a neighbourhood that is at the 10th percentile foreign born to one at the 90th percentile is 9.6 percentage points, with a 95 percent confidence interval from 4.9 to 14.5 percentage points. Because only one in five respondents in the survey indicated that immigration was the nation’s most important problem, this 9.6 percentage point increase represents a change of 45 per cent over the baseline probability. Among those who did not watch a broadcast, the contextual effect is a statistically insignificant -4.9 percentage points. No such interaction existed before the campaign. Not only did the campaign induce a contextual effect, it did so in the subset of people who were paying close attention. This finding is counter-intuitive,

<sup>88</sup>Edward Fieldhouse and David Cutts, *The Effectiveness of Local Party Campaigns in 2005: Combining Evidence from Campaign Spending and Agent Survey Data*, 2008.

<sup>89</sup>The measure of competitiveness is a Herfindahl index of vote concentration among Labour, the Conservative Party, and the Labour Party.

<sup>90</sup>Newspaper content might vary across papers, and especially across papers with different party affiliations. We are thus also interested in whether reading particular newspapers interacts with one’s local context. Deacon and co-authors provide a listing of newspapers by partisanship: David Deacon,

since media effects and local contextual effects are often thought of as substitutes. But it provides yet more evidence that national politics can shape local contextual effects.

<sup>91</sup>Using interaction models, we can also examine if the neighbourhood effect is especially strong among other key sub-groups. For instance, one might suspect that concerns about immigration are rooted in views that are at once local and sociotropic: respondents might be concerned about its impact on their neighbours. If so, we might expect a positive interaction between the share born outside the U.K. and the respondent's commitment to the neighbourhood just after the election. The BES mailback survey provides two such measures of neighborhood attachment. The first asked respondents "how strong are your feelings of attachment to your neighbourhood?" The second asked respondents to agree or disagree that: "I feel like I belong in this neighbourhood." Yet in the post-election data, neither of these measures of community attachment interacts with the local share born outside the U.K. These effects are not more pronounced among people who are more community-oriented, and are not likely to be driven by concern for one's neighbours.

Dominic Wring and Peter Golding, "The 'Take a Break Campaign?': National Print Media Reporting of the Election," in Dominic Wring, Jane Green, Roger Mortimore, and Simon Atkinson (eds.), *Political Communications: The General Election Campaign of 2005* (New York: Macmillan, 2007). The average post-election contextual effect for those who read papers supporting the Conservatives is 10.5 percentage points, while for other respondents it is 4.8 percentage points. The p-value for the one-sided test that the effect is smaller among readers of Tory-leaning papers is 0.058. However, we do not see a strong interaction between the respondent's own party loyalties and the post-election contextual effect. Nor do we see an interaction between the respondent's education level and the neighbourhood effect. To the extent that the Conservative-leaning papers were more likely to emphasize immigration issues, these findings are yet more evidence for the politicized places approach. How one responds to local experiences depends on the frames that connect those experiences to politics.

<sup>91</sup>In a similar vein, one might wonder if the effects of living near foreign-born residents are especially pronounced in economically deprived areas, a possibility suggested by theories of realistic group conflict. Yet in actuality, separate models detect no strong interaction between the share foreign born and variables including the local per cent unemployed, the per cent in routine jobs, or the per cent with no qualifications. Put differently, respondents are not more concerned about immigration in places where their neighbours are especially economically vulnerable.

### 3 Discussion and Conclusion

Contextual effects are not static. Even the same respondents living in the same neighbourhoods will respond differently to their neighbours depending on the broader national context. And this is not a finding that is specific to the U.S.: it shows up in the U.K. as well. Having identified the same processes at work in two different countries, we can be more confident that they are not idiosyncratic, or artifacts of multivariate analysis. Across countries and across time, we observe that contextual effects are influenced by the national political environment. This provides an alternate explanation for the past conflicting findings on inter-group threat. Perhaps the conflicting findings reflect a conflicted reality, as threatened responses come and go with national attention to immigration.

<sup>92</sup>One might also invert these conclusions, and use them to gain leverage in debates about the role that elites play in shaping public opinion.<sup>93</sup>This study suggests that salient elite rhetoric on an issue might be more effective when it resonates with experiences in people's day-to-day lives.<sup>94</sup>The influence of frames could be contingent not only on their persuasiveness and timing, as argued by Chong and Druckman,<sup>95</sup>but on their resonance—that is, their ability to highlight factors observed in people's own experience. Already, scholars have observed some evidence in favor of this view. As Butler and Stokes note, in 1964, Britons living in heavily immigrant areas were more likely to differentiate the two parties based on their stances on immigration. Information provided by national politics may resonate locally in different ways.

<sup>92</sup>See Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences* (University of Chicago Press, 1992); Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*; and Iyengar and Kinder, *News That Matters*.

<sup>93</sup>See Kinder, 'Communication and Opinion' and Mutz, 'Contextualizing Personal Experience.'

<sup>94</sup>See Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman, "A Theory of Framing and Opinion Formation," *Journal of Communication* 57 (2007) and Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman, "Framing Public Opinion in Competitive Democracies," *American Political Science Review* 101/04 (2007).

<sup>95</sup>David Butler and Donald Stokes, *Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice* (London, UK: Macmillan, 1975), p. 209.

Still, this study itself leaves several questions to future work. Here, for simplicity's sake, the information environment is typically characterized as a single national stream of information, received with equal intensity by all respondents or by those watching Party Broadcasts. Scholars can understand this in two ways. We can develop more accurate characterizations of the information environment, characterizations that acknowledge variation by media source and location. Where people get news shapes what news they get. And we can link that variation to the characteristics that make people more or less susceptible to the interactive effects highlighted in this paper. The interaction with campaign attention described above is a small step in this direction. Both characteristics of the respondent and characteristics of the community might shape the dissemination of contextual information.

Future work should also explore why specific aspects of the local context do or do not become politicized. Past research on the U.S. (and to some extent this paper's American analyses) emphasize the role of changes in local contexts, demonstrating that sudden inflows of immigrants can generate aversive responses. In those cases, residence in heavily immigrant communities did not correlate with anti-immigrant views. The studies here demonstrate that at least in the U.K., it is not changes but levels of ethnic diversity alone that generate concern about immigration. One might try to explain those differences with reference to residential mobility or differences in the role of local government in providing resources. Given that government-provided housing is far more prevalent in the U.K., it is plausible that traditional threat-style responses to large immigrant populations are more common there as well. In Britain, larger immigrant populations could be thought to indicate a shift in local political power and the allocation of local resources. In the U.S., with its high rates of home ownership, changes might be especially destabilizing. Changes might induce uncertainty about the future of the neighbourhood and an impetus to quickly sell one's home before prices

96decline. But as this paper has demonstrated, to produce a sizable contextual effect, the broader information environment must be conducive as well.

<sup>96</sup>See Gould, *Sharing America's Neighborhoods*, and Thomas J. Sugrue, *The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).

Dependent Variable	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	Independent Variables
Immig Big Local Problem?	2.18	1.12	1	4	
Employed	0.63	0.48	0	1	Years of Education
Education	14.17	2.58	8	19	
Income	60.37	47.52	5	200	Black
	0.29	0.45	0	1	Male
Age	50.35	16.12	18	91	Party ID
	1.67	3.20	1	5	Ideology
Immig. Don't Learn Eng Situation	0.67	0.47	0	1	Personal Ec Situation
	2.48	0.85	1	4	
Community Ec Situation	1.75	0.95	1	3	Contextual Variables
County Pct Imm 00-06	0.08	0.09	0.003	0.51	Δ County Pct Imm 00-06
	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.11	
County Log Med Hsh Income	10.6	0.23	9.83	11.30	Δ County Log Med Hsh Income
	0.13	0.061	-0.05	0.31	
County Pct Black	0.11	0.13	0.00	0.67	Δ County Pct Black
	0.007	0.02	-0.08	0.16	County Pct with BA
	0.23	0.09	0.08	0.64	
Δ County Pct with BA	0.03	0.02	-0.03	0.08	

Table 1: This tables summarizes the 830 non-Hispanic white and black respondents to the 2006 Pew Survey on immigration's national sample.

Variable	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.	Dependent
Immig. is Most Impt. Variables	0.23	0.41	0	1	Independent
Male	0.48	0.50	0	1	Unskilled Worker
	0.15	0.37	0	1	
Income	28773	23095	2250	100000	
Education	2.58	2.29	0	7	
Age	48.6	18.0	18	99	Conservative ID
	0.31	0.45	0	1	
Labour ID	0.35	0.49	0	1	Personal Ec.
Situation	2.86	0.96	1	5	General Ec. Situation
	2.69	0.92	1	5	
Immigrants Enrich Culture	3.08	1.05	1	5	Contextual Variables
Population Density	29.96	29.35	0.13	260.27	%
Routine Professions	33.2	14.3	2.4	74.0	
% Lone Parents	6.6	4.3	1.1	31.0	% Unemployed
	5.2	3.7	0.7	26.3	
% Over 65	16.7	6.5	1.4	54.7	% with High
Qualifications	18.3	10.2	2.9	72.3	
% Immigrant Inflow	0.5	0.8	0.0	15.6	% Born Outside
U.K.	6.1	5.7	0.2	43.3	

Table 2: For key variables in the BES, this table presents descriptive statistics for the 2,386 white respondents in England and Wales.




Figure 1: This figure depicts by month the number of stories in USA Today using the words “immigration” or “immigrants” that were about the U.S.  
38

# Predicting Immigration as Big Local Problem




Figure 2: For the 2006 U.S. survey, this figure depicts the first difference and cent confidence interval when each variable is shifted from its 10th percentile 90th while holding others at their means or medians.

### Saliency of Immigration




Figure 3: This figure shows interviews by day as well as the attention to immigration-related issues each week in Britain in 2005.

## Predicting Immigration as Most Important Problem




Figure 4: This figure shows the first differences given a shift in each independent variable, with the data separated into pre-election and post-election. Living in a heavily immigrant neighbourhood was a stronger predictor of concern about immigration after the 2005 British general election.

**Imm. Is Most Important  
Before Campaign**

**Imm. Is Most Important  
After Campaign**

**Imm. Is Most Important  
Difference**

Prob. =  
0.003

Prob. =  
0.01






Figure 5: For the 2005 British panel data, this figure presents the pre-election predicted impact of shifting to a heavily immigrant context, the post-election predicted impact, and the difference-in-difference estimate.

## Online Appendix

### Question wording, Pew Survey

- How big a problem (dependent variable): How big a problem is immigration in your local community? A very big problem, a moderately big problem, a small problem, or not a problem at all?
- Partisan identification: In politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or Independent?
- Ideology: In general, would you describe your political views as very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, or very liberal?
- Personal economic evaluation: How would you rate your own personal financial situation? Would you say you are in excellent shape, good shape, only fair shape or poor shape financially?

## Model Results, Pew Survey

	$\beta$	Std. Error	
Contextual			
County Pct Imm 00-06	2.852	0.538	$\Delta$ Pct Imm
00-06	17.012	3.446	
Lg Med Hsh Income	0.257	0.296	$\Delta$ Lg Med
Hsh Income	0.310	0.862	
Pct Black	0.509	0.397	$\Delta$ Pct Black
-4.620	3.109		Pct with BA
			-1.295
	0.649		
$\Delta$ Pct with BA	-2.800	3.826	
Individual-Level			
Years of Education	-0.002	0.018	Party ID
	0.013	0.028	
Income	-0.002	0.001	Ideology
	0.140	0.049	
Black	-0.060	0.153	Male
	0.082		Age
	-0.003	0.003	
<sup>1</sup> Employed	0.003	0.098	<sup>2</sup> 2.736
	3.103	<sup>3</sup> 3.408	<sup>4</sup> 3.100
	3.100	<sup>4</sup> 4.077	3.101

Table 3: This table presents the results of an ordered probit predicting non-Hispanic white and black Americans' responses to the question, "is immigration a big local problem?" 830 respondents are used to fit the model.

## Question wording, BES

- Most important issue (dependent variable): Now, I'd like to ask you a few questions about the issues and problems facing Britain today. As far as you're concerned, what is the single most important issue facing the country at the present time?
- Partisan identification: Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat, (Scottish National/ Plaid Cymru), or what?
- Personal economic evaluation: Now a few questions about economic conditions. How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what it was 12 months ago? Got a lot worse, Got a little worse, Stayed the same, Got a little better, Got a lot better.
- General economic evaluation: How do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed over the last 12 months? Got a lot worse, Got a little worse, Stayed the same, Got a little better, Got a lot better.
- Cultural contribution/threat: Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements... Immigrants make Britain more open to new ideas and cultures. Strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree

## Model Results, BES

	Before	After	Campaign	Campaign	
	$\beta$	Std. Error	$\beta$	Std. Error	Intercept
	0.486	2.243	0.541		1.863
Male	0.121	0.100	-0.113	0.108	Unemployed -1.045 0.467
	-0.544	0.425			
Unskilled	0.000	0.143	0.258	0.143	Education -0.095 0.027
	-0.110	0.029			
Income	-0.034	0.034	-0.036	0.037	Age 0.004 0.003 -0.004
	0.004				
Personal Ec. Sit.	-0.108	0.057	0.044	0.060	General Ec. Sit. -0.254
	0.060	-0.102	0.064		
Immig. Enrich Culture	-0.302	0.049	-0.368	0.051	Conservative 0.501 0.130
	0.390	0.132			
Labour	0.304	0.143	-0.101	0.160	Contextual Variables
Pop Density	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.002	Pct Routine Workers
	-0.028	0.009	-0.026	0.010	
Pct Lone Parents	0.062	0.020	0.016	0.020	Pct Unemployed -0.004
	0.020	0.000	0.021		
Pct Over 65	0.002	0.009	-0.006	0.009	Pct Well Ed -0.042 0.011
	-0.060	0.012			
Pct Imm Change	0.035	0.075	0.002	0.074	Pct Immigrant -0.008
	0.012	0.032	0.012		

Table 4: For the 2,386 white BES panel respondents, this table presents two logistic regressions predicting naming immigration Britain's most important problem before and after the 2005 campaign.